

1965

# The Soviet drive in the Middle East

Raymond W. Weber  
*Lehigh University*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd>



Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

---

## Recommended Citation

Weber, Raymond W., "The Soviet drive in the Middle East" (1965). *Theses and Dissertations*. 3336.  
<https://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd/3336>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact [preserve@lehigh.edu](mailto:preserve@lehigh.edu).

THE SOVIET DRIVE IN  
THE MIDDLE EAST

by

Raymond William Weber

A Thesis

Presented to the Graduate Faculty  
of Lehigh University  
in Candidacy for the Degree of  
Master of Arts

Lehigh University

1965

This thesis is accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

November 24, 1964  
(date)

Ole M. Furusund  
Professor in Charge

Larry B. Joplin  
Head of the Department

C O N T E N T S

I	Stalin and the Middle East . . . . .	1
<del>II</del>	Policy Change After Stalin . . . . .	17
III	1955: Arms for Egypt. . . . .	31
IV	Ideological Reinterpretation . . . . .	52
V	1956: Suez. . . . .	59
VI	Trouble with Syria . . . . .	83
VII	An Evaluation. . . . .	.103



During the life time of Stalin the Arab bloc, and the underdeveloped areas in general, were praised or condemned by the standard of their acceptance of the Soviet point of view. There was no tolerance on the part of the Soviet Union, for neutralism was considered to be no better than hostility. When Stalin passed away this hard line was somewhat eased by his successors who realized that the Western aid policies were winning friends. The Soviet Union was worried by the creation of Western defense pacts and the most likely response was to woo the states away from the West. With the establishment of the Baghdad Pact the Soviets attempted to vitiate its power by isolating the Middle Eastern members from their Arab neighbors. To this end the Soviet Union sought to gain the support of Egypt and Syria who were displeased by the fact that Iraq was being bolstered by aid sent to her as a Pact member. The Soviet trade and aid program began modestly enough but assumed large and strategic importance in 1955. In that year Egypt purchased a large supply of Czechoslovakian armaments, which action sent a chill down Western spines. Such a large amount of armament in the hands of Nasser caused a shift in the Middle Eastern equilibrium which the West had been trying to construct.

The next year Egypt was again in the news when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. After failing in an attempt to establish an international agency to control the operation of the Canal Britain and France invaded Egypt

in the hope of forcing a concession from Nasser. But when the action was condemned by the United States and world opinion the aggressors had to back down. This blunder gave the Soviet Union the opportunity of posing as a friend of the Arabs. The Soviets were capitalizing on the economic needs of the Middle East as well as on its political instability.

Another crisis in 1957, this time over Syria, found the Soviet Union taking advantage of a turmoil aroused by Syria. It was widely believed that Syria was about to become a Soviet satellite, an opinion made credible by the fact that a great deal of Communist armament was being shipped to that country. Also, the Syrian Communist Party, under the leadership of Khaled Bakdash was quite a potent force in the country. Again, the Soviet Union professed support of Syria against the aggressors who were prodding Turkey to attack.

By a policy combination of political turmoil and economic aid the Soviets were winning the praise of the Arab nationalists. But the Syrian Crisis gave the Arabs second thoughts. They did not want to become too closely aligned with the Soviet bloc. Many important elements in Syria feared Soviet domination and this was an important cause of the United Arab Republic. Thus, Soviet policy was successful in winning friends but not in removing the neutral's fear of alignment with one bloc.

## I Stalin and the Middle East

During World War II, the Soviet Union was wary of the various nationalistic movements which were becoming quite strong throughout the Middle East. Such drives as those toward Pan-Islam and Pan-Arabism presented problems for the Soviet Union which had about thirty million Islamic peoples within its borders. With respect to the Pan-Islamic movement, the Soviet Union maintained a passive hostility while Pan-Arabism received somewhat better treatment. For the particularly aggressive Arab, nationalist communism was not especially satisfying and was not able to hold such men as Michel Aflaq who found the Communist movement wanting.<sup>1</sup>

With the end of World War II the Middle East appeared to be a fruitful ground for Soviet penetration, since France was relinquishing control over certain of her holdings and Britain was coming under increased Arab pressure to get out of the area. If we add to this the general instability within the Arab countries, we can see that here was a power vacuum made for exploitation.<sup>2</sup>

As is known from a study of history, Russia had tried to gain a footing in the Middle East for the last two hundred years and this drive has now been strengthened by Communist ideology, which would seek to liberate the peoples of the area from exploitation. Also, the development of the cold war made it worthwhile for the Soviet Union to attempt to gain a position of power in the area so that its

economic and military potential could be denied to the Western powers. But instead of the time honored method of establishing sovereignty over the area, we shall see that the method now to be employed by the Soviet Union is to establish itself a guarantor of the neutral's independence and provider of technical and economic aid.<sup>3</sup>

But in attempting to win influence within the Middle East the Soviet Union was handicapped by the fact that the regimes in that area were very much anti-Communist and had banned the parties to which the Soviet Union could appeal in this situation.<sup>4</sup>

During the period between 1947 and 1953 the Soviet Union had not as yet decided how to use Arab nationalism for the purpose of gaining a foothold in the Middle East. The Arab League was accused of being a British agency, a "reactionary bloc," an "instrument in the struggle against the national liberation movement in the Middle East." After 1950 the Soviets called for the liberation of the Mid-Eastern peoples from colonial domination but there was no sympathy for the activities of Arab nationalist movements. Instead, the liberation was considered to be the task of Communist or other sympathetic groups.

Moscow approved of the left wing of the Egyptian Wafd Party but not of the remaining members. The Wafd was accused of being afraid of moving against the British and the monarchy. The Moslem Brotherhood was condemned as being only outwardly anti-British while in reality it tried to crush

the "progressive forces" in Egypt. The Arab League, which was accused of being a pro-British group, was by 1950 condemned as having come under the influence of American imperialism.<sup>5</sup> An example of the Soviet opinion of the Arab League is found in Red Star of April 29, 1950. Here the League was spoken of as

... an instrument for the enslavement of the peoples of the Arab East by the British imperialists. The British and American imperialists are jointly exploiting the League's leaders, who are obedient to them, for the realization of a further war and for the suppression of the progressive forces of the countries of the Middle East.<sup>6</sup>

One important theoretical issue which was to have important consequences for Soviet policy was the treatment of "bourgeois nationalism." Unfortunately for the Soviets their initial reaction to this phenomenon was to deny their "progressive" role and to condemn them as agents of imperialism.<sup>7</sup> Stalin did not believe that anyone could be neutral between Communism and Capitalism and this meant the universal rule that the Soviet Union would support only those groups which strove to liberate their countries from the yoke of imperialism under the Communist banner. Stalinist doctrine taught that "bourgeois parties" were incapable of eliminating imperialism and that only a Communist dominated movement could accomplish the task. The Large Soviet Encyclopedia observed that

When the proletariat enters the fight as an independent political force, the upper strata of the national bourgeoisie betrays its people, and goes over to the camp of the imperialists....At present the proletariat is the hegemon in this fight.

This view was considered mandatory for all Communists and it was included in the doctrine taught in Russian schools. The rule controlled the Communist attitude toward all such rival groups and was used as an excuse for excluding all rival groups from the Communist fight to win power.<sup>8</sup>

Yet, one could readily imagine that this attitude of the Soviet Union was bound to collide with the facts of life sooner or later. Surely the Soviet Union had to come to realize that their interpretation of the situation in the newly independent, underdeveloped countries was false. And, indeed, this attitude did come under fire beginning in the late 1940's. A particularly interesting account of this new interpretation and re-evaluation is given in the work by John Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India. In this work Kautsky examines the various strategies employed by the Communists in their drive for world domination. There is the right strategy, which regards imperialism and feudalism as the main enemy and therefore, Communist strategy calls for a bourgeois democratic revolution followed by a proletarian Socialist revolution. This strategy employs an alliance between those anti-feudal and anti-imperialist parties, both labor and bourgeoisie. This is what is called a "united front from above" or a popular Front.

Another strategy is that of the "Left." This considers Capitalism and the native bourgeoisie to be enemies,



at least as important in rank as foreign imperialism and feudalism. This strategy envisages an early Socialist revolution merging with or even skipping the bourgeois-democratic revolution. This strategy seeks to encompass the workers, petty bourgeoisie, and the peasants, as well as interested individuals of any organization. It tries to gather as many people into the fold as possible who will follow the Communist line, and who will leave their former parties and denounce their former leaders as traitors.

These above strategies were used prior to World War II. However, during that war the Chinese Communists developed a third way which Kautsky chooses to call the Neo-Maoist strategy. Like the Right strategy, it opposes imperialism and feudalism and expects two revolutions. Also, like the Right, it would like to have an alliance of workers, peasants, petty-bourgeoisie, and anti-imperialist bourgeoisie. However, unlike the Right and more like the Left, it approaches these groups not from above through their principal parties but from below, in opposition to rival parties. Thus we see that the Communist Party is claiming to be the true representative of all those who are members of exploited classes. But, more than this, the Neo-Maoist strategy would also like to include certain capitalist classes not employed before. In short, this strategy developed by the Chinese, seeks to gather together all those who would be anti-imperialist,

that is, against the enemies of the Chinese or Russian Communists as the case may be. Anyone could be included who would be for the Communist line and against American, British, and French interests. This strategy does not employ dogmatically a violent or a peaceful method; either could be used when necessary. The use of violence is a tactical tool and is not a strategic necessity.

Moscow, too, began to re-evaluate its approach to the realities of the day. In 1947, when relations were strained with the United States, Moscow moved from a Right strategy to one of the Left. The Soviet Academy of Sciences came out with a particularly strong denunciation of Nehru and those like him who were accused of being imperialistic agents opposed to movements of the people. Before this time, the Soviets had been employing the Right strategy and so, such bourgeois representatives were included in the common cause in the battle against Nazism. But during this meeting there also was noticeable a difference of opinion among several of the members. Academicians Dyakov and Balabushevich denounced the entire bourgeoisie and favored a movement to the Left strategy, a proletarian, anti-capitalist approach. On the other hand, Zhukov, the head of the Academy's Pacific Institute, denounced only the big bourgeoisie, and thus was left open a path for a united front from below to include some sections of the bourgeoisie. This presentation of a middle way was the first time such a development had occurred in Moscow's strategy.



In a report to the first Cominform meeting in September 1947, Zhdanov introduced in his speech elements of what we have called the Neo-Maoist strategy. However, this strategy was not applied by him to the Asian situation. But this speech by Zhdanov was interpreted in a Neo-Maoist manner by Zhukov in an article written as an analysis of the colonial areas that had recently won independence. However, Dyakov and Balabushevich at this time continued to expound the necessity of a Left strategy in the underdeveloped countries. And as of February 1948, the time of the South-East Asia Youth Conference, it was still not decided whether the Left or the Middle strategy was to be employed by the Asian Communist Parties. All that was mentioned was that the Right strategy was no longer the style.

Not until 1949 was a definite decision made between the Left and the Middle strategies. The adoption of a Neo-Maoist, or Middle strategy, was signaled by a publication in Pravda in June 1949. At that time Liu Shao Chi asserted that all Asian Communist Parties must cooperate with sections of the bourgeoisie. Also in that year, in several articles written for the Soviet Academy of Science, not only Zhukov, but also Dyakov and Balabushevich, the former exponents of the Left strategy, came out in favor of the inclusion of bourgeois elements in a united front from below.

It is well for the Russian Communists that they have adopted this middle path for, indeed, it does seem to fit the present-day situation in the underdeveloped countries. Using this method the Communists can invite the cooperation of "all classes, parties, groups, organizations and individuals", including capitalists and those more feudalistic elements. All that these people need do is to show their friendliness for the Soviet Union and their antagonism toward the Western countries. Now the Communist Party can claim to represent not only the interests of the workers, but also the interests of certain Capitalists. Communist propaganda emphasizes the interests held in common by all, both workers and Capitalists, against those imperialists from the West. In short, the Cold War now has replaced the class struggle. This, of course, is a perversion of classical Marxism, but it is a logical development out of Lenin's revolutionary doctrines. Marx had stressed the importance of the class interest and the necessity of division among the various groups. Lenin, on the other hand, used to great effect, the principle that the workers must be lead by an elite group which alone knows the path of historical necessity. This Leninist conception divorced the Party from the workers by allowing this group to employ any means and any tools to further its ends. From this it follows that even the Capitalists can be used to further Communistic aims.<sup>9</sup>

Yet in spite of this theoretical discussion, the

Middle East, as a rule, received little mention. Of course, there were a few books and articles written about the area, but the number signified a lack of interest in the Middle East. The reasons for this lack of interest are several: for one, there were no large parties in the Mid-East, and the working-class and Communist groups were so small as not to warrant much attention. Books and articles were written on the condition of peasants in Syria and Lebanon, in Egypt, and Iraq, but nothing was said about trade unions or political parties. Those in power in the Mid-East were believed to be hostile or, if friendly, potential traitors. A general world crisis was expected by the Soviet Union and when it came the Mid-East would also be affected. In view of these conditions, the Soviets did not believe that there was much that could be done to gain more influence in the Middle East.<sup>10</sup>

Since the Soviet Union had no outstanding tactics to implement in the Middle East around the year 1950, the somewhat standard procedure of supporting Egypt's drive for the ousting of Britain and the non-cooperation of the Arabs with the West was employed. Yet the Soviets were not happy about the fact that Egypt failed to condemn the United States along with Britain. As long as Egypt remained neutral between America and the Soviet Union, Moscow saw no chance of a rapprochement with Cairo.<sup>11</sup>

Also, while Stalin lived, there was little done to develop economic relations with non-bloc countries. One

hindrance to the expansion of trade was the fact that Russia had not yet achieved an economic growth sufficient to allow the exportation of finished goods on a large scale. Still another reason for the lack of trade with the Arab countries was that before the Second World War these states obtained only 5% of their total imports from the Soviet Union. During the War the amount of trade dropped even further, so that the Soviet Union lost interest in the possibilities of trade with the Arab bloc.<sup>12</sup>

One important drive sponsored by the Soviet Union in the Middle East was a propaganda campaign to foster some hatred for the American imperialists. As far as the non-Communist nationalists in the area were concerned, Britain and France were the colonial exploiters, whereas it was the United States which had helped to solve the problems hindering their withdrawal. Soviet propaganda tried to counteract this favorable impression by exposing the "real" intentions of the Americans, namely, to replace the British and French as colonial exploiters. The Arab states were told that their enemy was not Britain and France so much as the Americans, who pretended to be the friend of the Arabs. The Soviet Union warned that any country friendly to America could not count on any Soviet support.<sup>13</sup>

If the Soviet Union had little interest in the Middle East before 1950 it must have taken notice of Western activities which began in that year. In a Declaration of May 25, 1950, the Western Powers made an offer to sell the Middle

Eastern states arms to be used for defense and internal security. But the offer was received with little interest because the Arabs were more interested in finding arms for use against Israel, and did not want weapons if they could not be used for aggressive purposes. Also, there was some friction over the stalemate in the Anglo-Egyptian talks on the British military base in Suez.<sup>14</sup>

Britain came to realize that the Arab states were not interested in having a situation in which Britain would maintain a system of bases throughout the Middle East for the protection of her interests. Therefore, along with the United States, the British tried to produce another alternative which took the form of multilateral defense agreements. This meant that the Western bloc would assume responsibility for the defense of the whole area, with the old system of imperial relationships consigned to the grave. The British hoped that such an arrangement would counteract the nationalist drive sponsored by the Wafd in the fall of 1951. But the proposal came too late to stop the abrogation of the 1936 treaty by King Faruq. Even so, the Egyptians were wary of the Western offer attached to which was the possibility that Egypt could be reoccupied. The Western offer of November 1951 for regional defense was turned down as most unacceptable.

This strong position taken by Egypt induced the United States and Britain to attempt the establishment of a defense pact in partnership with those Arab states such as

Iraq, who were friendly to the West. These moves were the beginning of what was soon to be the Baghdad Pact.

Even with the Egyptian revolution in 1952, and the coming to power of General Naguib, the situation with respect to British interests remained the same. Although the new regime proclaimed its intention to concentrate on domestic problems, its extreme nationalism in foreign affairs was evident. General Naguib did bend a little when he granted the Sudan's right to self-determination and independence, but this was his only act of moderation. On the matter of the British bases in the canal zone, the withdrawal of British troops, and new defense agreements, General Naguib was adamant. General Naguib appeared to follow the line that if any concessions were to be made, the British would have to make them.<sup>15</sup>

The Soviet Union was not at all impressed with the new revolutionary government in Egypt. An example of Communist thought on the matter is found in a Polish Press Agency report of August 20, 1952, which spoke of the coup as "aimed at establishing a fascist military dictatorship to stifle the growing anti-imperialist movement in Egypt. General Naguib's bloody reprisals against the working class show his fear of the growing power of the Egyptian masses".<sup>16</sup>

But if the Soviet Union had no use for Egypt's new government, the feeling was reciprocated by Colonel Nasser



who approved of defensive efforts taken as a precaution against Soviet aggression. Nasser dubbed the Soviet Union as an aggressor and asked, "The object of the aggressor? To reach the oil fields of Abadan, Mosul, the Dharan, and to reach Egypt on account of her strategic position which is of capital importance for Africa and the Mediterranean".

The Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council observed that

There seems no doubt that Egypt today holds in all respects to the side of the West. Her culture, her commerce, and her economic life are bound to the West. Ideologically she is definitely opposed to Communism. Militarily she considers that the only danger capable of threatening the Middle East is a Soviet invasion..."

As far as Nasser was concerned, Britain should have the right to enter the bases in the canal in the event of war.<sup>17</sup>

But as a rule, the Soviet Union was not much concerned about the new Egyptian government. The Soviet Middle Eastern experts condemned the junta as fascists, but official Soviet policy was more reserved and took a position of watchful waiting. If the Egyptians attacked the West for some reason or another, the Soviets assumed a more cordial posture, whereas Egyptian cooperation with the "imperialists" was readily condemned.<sup>18</sup>

Before the Egyptian revolution in 1952 the country was primarily agrarian in nature and which enterprise accounted for 90% of the Gross National Product. Basically, Egypt had a free-enterprise economy although the state did supervise such things as irrigation and railways. Taxes

were low with the government using only a little over 20% of the national income. Income was very unequal and foreigners were very important in the economy, and in some sectors, dominant. Also, the military played a minor part in the society which was run by civilians and in which there was much intellectual and political freedom.<sup>19</sup>

After the revolution the new rulers tried to put some discipline and life into the civil administration and sponsored legislation limiting agricultural estates to 200 acres, along with a distribution of land to peasants. But this was only a small endeavor since there was not enough suitable land to distribute to the fast growing population. Industrialization was necessary to relieve the ills which Egypt was experiencing.<sup>20</sup>

To better develop the country, Egypt was to embark upon a program which was to become quite familiar in the under-developed countries. This was the adoption of an approach whose philosophy was a combination of nationalism, militarism, and socialism. The basis of this creed was resentment of Western economic and political domination along with a resolve to assert national sovereignty. Socialism was adopted in the belief that more social equality would result. Capitalism, with its emphasis on individual gain, was considered to be immoral since it could only be had at the expense of the public interest. It was also believed that social planning would be the panacea which would bring economic development, social welfare, and national power.



There was also the conviction that since the objective was to be neutral in foreign policy, then an economic policy must be neither capitalist after the Western model, nor Socialist after the Soviet pattern, since to adopt either arrangement wholeheartedly would necessitate alignment with one or the other bloc. But Egypt found herself copying the Soviet pattern, seeing only the accomplishments and none of the costs in the human condition. Also used as models for Egypt's development were Yugoslavia and Indian and Western socialism. It does not appear as though those who found themselves in positions of power in 1952 had a pre-arranged program with which to carry out the development of Egypt. Rather, it would seem as though between 1952 and 1956, when civilian influence was still great, that the new leaders moved cautiously along orthodox lines so as not to disrupt the Egyptian situation.<sup>21</sup>

In 1953 the United States had a new president and came to realize that those countries on the southern border of the Soviet Union were not following political principles which would militate against their accepting American economic and military aid.<sup>22</sup>

In that same year, Secretary of State Dulles made a tour of the Middle East and said that he had found a "vague desire" among those countries close to the Soviet Union for some sort of collective security system. Dulles also asserted: "While awaiting the creation of a formal Security Association, the United States, I am sure, can

usefully help strengthen the interrelated defenses of these countries if they want strength, not against each other or against the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples".

The first reaction to this American offer came from Turkey and Pakistan, who announced in February 1954 that they would hold talks on collective defense. A few days later, the United States declared that it would give to Pakistan both economic and military aid. At the same time, Pakistan assured Egypt, which was experiencing difficulty between Nasser and Naguib, that she would continue to support the Arab cause against Israel, and Egypt's demands for Britain to withdraw from Suez bases.<sup>23</sup>

## II Policy Change After Stalin

As we have seen, Stalin followed a rigid policy toward those countries which tried to remain neutral between East and West. However, a short time before his death in 1953, Stalin did appear to have a change in attitude, no doubt brought on by the realization that if the United States was trying to woo these countries, then the Soviet Union had better not be left out in the cold by following a policy which would give the Americans a free hand among the neutrals. The Russians might have felt that their chances were good when Communists like Khaled Bakdash were running in Parliamentary elections. Communist propaganda now began to speak of the necessity for "broad, popular fronts uniting all national forces". In a speech made before the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953 Malenkov seemed to mark a change of policy when he made some favorable remarks about Middle Eastern governments.<sup>1</sup>

But this change in attitude on the part of the Soviet leaders did not mean that they were ready to entertain proposals such as that made by an Egyptian delegation which was touring Europe looking for economic aid and military supplies. The Egyptian request was given little consideration by the Soviet Union no doubt because the Soviets were not yet certain just how far they wanted to go in order to gain influence among the neutrals.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of this rejection of the Egyptian proposal

it should be noted that about this time, the possibility of a Soviet economic offensive became a real option in view of the fact the Soviet economy was rapidly recovering from the effects of the war. The 10% annual increase in production meant that the Soviet economy could support a measure of economic competition with the West in the underdeveloped countries.

During the year 1954, the Soviet Union appeared to realize that the foreign aid programs of the United States were helping to maintain Western economic strength among the underdeveloped countries even though these same states were demanding the withdrawal of Western physical presence. From these facts, the Russians were bound to draw the necessary conclusions.<sup>3</sup>

The period following the death of Stalin was a momentous one for the leadership of the Soviet Union. Not only were there problems of succession, but also world affairs were showing most explicitly the folly of following a dogmatic approach to international politics. We have mentioned the fact that with the ending of British and French colonial domination in the Middle East, there was a power vacuum to be filled and the Soviet Union, for her own security, had to make the attempt at filling the void. This particular problem did not occur with respect to all the underdeveloped countries. Stalin, and his successors, were suspicious of those who considered themselves neutral between East and West, but they were not too much concerned with those

neutral states lying some distance from the borders of the Soviet Union. But the states of the Middle East were an entirely different matter. Since the Arab states could serve as military bases for a potential aggressor, the Soviet Union had to remove Britain from the area by diplomatic process and prevent the entry of any third power which could threaten Soviet security — most notably, the United States. For this end there were propaganda and political campaigns (e.g. the advocacy of the partition of Palestine) designed to weaken the position of Britain and to get her out of the Middle East. As was said, this was a most critical period for Soviet diplomacy because Soviet power had to succeed that of Britain's before the United States, with her superior economic potential, could fill the void. Since the United States already had superior economic potential for aid programs and represented a military threat, Soviet diplomacy would have to be of superior quality. But at the same time, the old Stalinist opinions of bourgeois groups — which we have seen — no longer could be followed, since they did not fit reality, and the luxury of time, in which one could gradually form loyal party men into a new mold with which to view the situation, could no longer be afforded.

Thus, as the power of Khrushchev began to grow within the Soviet Union there followed a change in attitude toward the "national bourgeoisie".<sup>4</sup> This new policy, which at times was followed even though it adversely affected the

Communist parties in the Middle East, we shall now examine.

In looking at the countries of the Middle East, the Soviet Union did not see a ready and likely prospect which could be convinced of the benefits in a Soviet connection. However, the Soviets were somewhat partial to Syria because of the strength of the Communist Party in that country.<sup>5</sup> Of all the Communist parties in the Arab states, that of Syria had become the most unified under the leadership of Khaled Bakdash. The "Partisans of Peace", a fellow-traveling movement during the early 1950's, had helped to create a favorable atmosphere for Communism among some important members of the bourgeoisie of Damascus. Also, the Syrian Communist Party had been successful in gaining a measure of influence in the army.<sup>6</sup> Of course, for the various governments of Syria, the Soviet Union had little use. A democratic regime in the late 1940's was accused of persecuting Communists; the military dictatorship of Husni Zaim, who came to power in 1949, was said to be a stooge of the American and French imperialists, an enemy of progressive forces, and attempting the "fascistization of the country". Zaim was overthrown by Sami Hinnawi who in turn was called a British agent by Moscow, but on the whole he was the victim of fewer epithets than his predecessor. The next to rule Syria was Adib Shishakli, but the Soviet Union maintained a passive attitude toward his regime.

The non-Communist parties of Syria had been considered



as enemies of the Communists; however, during Shishakli's administration there was a trend toward a "national front" policy. Those Syrian parties, which the Soviet Union now favored, were the National Party headed by Sabri al Assali which represented the "national bourgeoisie and the land-owners", and the Socialist Republican Ba'ath Party which represented "the national bourgeoisie, the small entrepreneurs, some sections of artisans, and also having workers and peasants among its members". The Soviet Union spoke favorably of these parties as representing the trend toward Syrian independence and opposing Western imperialism. However, the party which was the largest up until the year 1955, the People's Party, was accused of being the representative of the monopolists and upper strata of the national bourgeoisie.<sup>7</sup>

Shishakli was ousted in February 1954 at which time a democratic administration came into power. The Communists again had more freedom to maneuver and were soon to establish one of the strongest organizations in the country. With the coming of the new government, Soviet influence began to grow within Syria and this new prestige was not solely caused by the Syrian Communists.

The Soviet Union had been indifferent toward the Shishakli government and when he was overthrown, the Soviets did not comment on the event. It was not until much later that Shishakli was characterized in the Soviet press as a "Western agent". The attitude which the Russians took with

respect to Shishakli while he was still in power is reflected by the fact that Mr. Vyshinski voted in favor of Syria in the Security Council meeting in January of 1954, when that Arab state was engaged with Israel in a dispute over the Jordan River.<sup>8</sup>

Upon the removal of Shishakli, the Soviet Union assumed a cautious attitude, not knowing what to expect from the new Syrian government. The new administration, under the leadership of Farizal Khouri, was thought to be lax in attacking imperialism.<sup>9</sup> But in spite of this hesitancy on the part of the Russians, more support was forthcoming for Syria. Relations of a commercial and cultural nature were developed: a delegation of Syrian students paid a visit to the Soviet Union, and a Soviet film festival took place in Damascus. The new posture of the Soviets was revealed by the position taken by that country when Syria banned the film The Fall of Berlin. The Soviet Union accused West Germany and the United States of applying pressure upon Syria to ban the film. Also around this time Moscow more and more warned Syria of the threat which Turkey was becoming. The Soviet press warned the Syrian people that Turkey coveted Aleppo and other parts of Northern Syria. Given the nature of the Syrian mood and situation, these warnings were not without effect.<sup>10</sup>

At about the same time that Moscow was considering the possibility of winning Syria over to the Soviet cause, the



decision had been made that it was well worth making an attempt at wooing Egypt. The nationalistic excitement within Egypt was proper ground for a cultural penetration by the Soviets. One example of Soviet writings showing the new approach is an article entitled "In Egypt" which appeared in Pravda on August 15, 1954. Here was given a Marxist analysis of classical Egypt. It was said that Egypt had now begun to take notice of her "polite Russian friends". The article asked why it was that in a land of such rich natural resources there should be such poverty while a few wealthy businessmen lived so handsomely. The bourgeoisie were said to represent foreign money which had brought the outrageous "American way of life", which was symbolized by gangster movies, comic strips, and Coca Cola.<sup>11</sup>

This new Soviet enthusiasm for the Egyptian cause was accompanied by increased contacts on the part of the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. Daniel Solod, with the foreign ministry of that Arab state. Ambassador Solod assured Egypt that the Arab cause would receive the complete support of the Soviet Union. The Russians demonstrated this support by vetoing the proposal of New Zealand in the Security Council calling for freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. This proposal had been a move against the Egyptian prohibition of Israeli shipping in the Canal. Previously, a similar proposal had only met with a Soviet abstention.

This Soviet move had come after the late 1953 conflict between Egypt and Britain which resulted in many incidents along the Suez Canal. When relations grew friendlier between Egypt and the Soviet Union, a trade delegation headed by the Egyptian Deputy Minister of War paid a visit to Moscow, and in March of 1954 a trade agreement was signed in Cairo. Hassan Raghieb remarked that Moscow had been very impressive and the Egyptian Minister in Moscow, Azizal Masri, praised the Soviet position "in favor of the peoples fighting for national independence".<sup>12</sup>

Also in March 1954, the Soviet Union raised to embassy rank its legation in Cairo. But at the same time similar action was taken in Tel-Aviv.<sup>13</sup> No doubt the Russians were not yet ready to put all their eggs in one basket.

During the Spring of 1954 certain events occurred which made it imperative for the Soviet Union to bolster its position in the Middle East. On April 2, a defense pact was signed between Turkey and Pakistan which carried an invitation to other countries in the neighborhood to join. At the same time, Nuri es-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, asserted that his country would purchase Western arms in conformity with the proposals made in 1950. And the next month, on May 19, the United States signed a defense treaty with Pakistan. Britain was not too sure whether or not

these defense arrangements were the smart thing to do. The British were hesitant in assuming obligations in an area in which there was no certainty that she would have a land base from which to launch a counterattack in case of conflict.

The reaction in Moscow was to send protests to Pakistan and Turkey, while Egypt warned the United States that she would do her best to limit such a pact.<sup>14</sup>

The Egyptian press launched a campaign against Iraq for her disposition to accept American aid. This attack was probably caused by Egypt's anger over the fact that an Arab state was withdrawing from a neutral position. By following a neutral policy, Egypt had hoped to pressure the United States into forcing Britain to leave the Suez Canal.<sup>15</sup> Still another cause for Egypt's wrath was the possibility that Iraq might be strengthened to such an extent by Western aid that Iraq, and not Egypt, would become the dominant Arab power.

The feeling of Egypt was reflected in a statement by the Commander in Chief of the Egyptian army, Abdel Hakim Amer, printed in Izvestia. He said that the real threat to the Middle East was Western domination, and not Soviet penetration. The Soviet Union, in turn, reciprocated the compliment by refraining from criticism of Egyptian domestic developments. In May of 1954 General Naguib clashed with Colonel Nasser, but the Soviet Union did not bother to comment on this development, nor on the fact that the Egyptian press was vigorously denouncing Communism.<sup>16</sup>

The summer of 1954 was a time of uncertainty with

respect to Soviet Egyptian relations. Events occurred which made one wonder just what the relationship between the two states was. By this time a military alignment based on Western power had begun to appear. Turkey, a NATO member, had a defense agreement with Pakistan which had a defensive pact with the United States, and Iraq was expressing willingness to accept Western arms. In August 1954 Iraq proposed an extensive defense pact and discussed with Egyptian delegates, the possibility of Egypt's inclusion. But Egypt strongly opposed such an idea because of her rivalry with Iraq.<sup>17</sup>

This situation put Egypt into a difficult position. If other Arab states followed the Iraqi example, Egypt could find herself isolated and without influence. For Egypt the problem was this: to build up her power so that she could be the dominant power while at the same time, maintaining a neutral posture. If Nasser held to his opinion of the Soviet Union, which we have quoted above, a shift into the Soviet camp would be repulsive for him. On the other hand, if Egypt turned West, she would set an example for the other Arab states which would then tend to follow the Egypt-Iraqi example. But, if the Arab bloc moved into the Western camp, not only would they fear neo-colonialism, but most important, as far as Egypt was concerned, there would be no special position for her from which she could rise to become the dominant Arab power.

In order to maintain a neutral posture Egypt began,

in the summer of 1954, to import Soviet wheat and fuel while, at the same time, she increased her trade with Eastern Europe.<sup>18</sup> Also, in September, a Soviet cultural center was opened in Cairo and an Egyptian tourist agency was discussing the opening of an office in Moscow.<sup>19</sup>

But in the latter part of 1954 Egypt signed an agreement with Britain on the future of the Suez Canal. Britain declared that the treaty of 1936 was terminated (Egypt had already denounced it in October of 1951) and the new agreement called for British evacuation of the Canal Zone bases within twenty months. However, if there occurred an act of aggression against a country which was a member of the Arab League or on Turkey, then Britain would be allowed to base her troops in the Canal Zone. In the event of "a threat of an armed attack", Egypt and Britain would immediately hold consultations. This agreement was not considered to be an alliance, and the termination of the 1936 treaty meant that Britain would no longer have an instrument to maintain her own interests in the area in the same manner as in times past. This was a victory for Egypt.<sup>20</sup>

Russia, however, saw this as a gain for American diplomacy, a movement by Egypt toward the West. No doubt, it did show that Egypt was not ready to lean too far to one side, but the Soviets did not seem to accept this position. Perhaps they thought that a neutral would only maintain such a posture until won over by trade and aid. It would appear as though the Soviets were not yet ready to accept neutralism

on its own terms. This Soviet attitude is revealed by the Soviet reaction to the Egypt-Britain agreement of October.

The Soviet press was the first to attack Egypt for what it considered to be her folly at joining the American camp. Officially, the Soviet Union did not curse the Egyptians and appeared to sympathize with her foolish act, the result of American intrigue which had dupped Egypt's rulers. But one Soviet propaganda agency, the "Voice of National Independence and Peace", which was an Arab language radio station in Budapest, called the leader of Egypt treasonous and deserving to be overthrown by the people.

However, as time passed, even official Soviet opinion became more critical of the agreement which was "the first step toward the inclusion of Egypt in the Western bloc". Now Soviet propaganda gave its opinion on Egyptian domestic affairs to the extent that the Moslem Brotherhood was backed in its conflict with the regime, Colonel Nasser damned and General Naguib supported, the Wafd praised, and the junta castigated. The news agency TASS, took Egypt to task for her persecution of the Communists and the "Partisans of Peace". "The whole nation dissociates itself from a government that has been utterly dishonored".<sup>21</sup>

And when Nasser assumed power for himself, the Soviet Union almost burst a blood vessel. Moscow lamented the fate of the true democrats who had fallen under the hand of violent reactionaries. The cruelty of the regime was said to



reveal the extreme measures to which it had to resort because of fear of the people. Egypt was warned that the agreement she signed with Britain was against the best interests of herself and all Arab states. The workers of Egypt were said to face a long fight before they would have a democratic government. The economic and social reforms, such as the agrarian reform, were said to be devices to save the large landowners from a revolution which must, nevertheless, come.

By the latter part of 1954, Egypt's new government had received more adverse Soviet criticism than had the Wafd administration in the two years before the revolution.<sup>22</sup> Thus, what began as a new and favorable attitude toward the Egyptian government, appeared to degenerate into a more hostile one.

But this Soviet criticism did not seem to influence Egypt's domestic course of action. During the winter of 1954, the Moslem Brotherhood was eliminated and many Communists had been thrown in prison with lengthy sentences. However, the Soviet Union did not go so far in its condemnation of Egypt as to wash its hands of her; Egypt had not yet become a Western ally. The friction between Egypt and Turkey (plus other Western states) gave the Soviet Union renewed hope, and gradually the Soviets eased their criticism.<sup>23</sup> During the Cairo Conference of Arab prime ministers Egypt denounced the West in general, but Turkey and Iraq in particular. When Nasser accepted an invitation to

attend the conference at Bandung, he signified his position as being definitely neutralist.<sup>24</sup>

Although the Soviet Union was heatedly attacking the Egyptian government in the latter half of 1954, such was not the case with respect to Syria. Soviet-Syrian relations became friendlier as was shown by the cultural exchanges and visits to the Soviet Union by Syrian students, agricultural experts, and physicians. Syrian scientists visited Russia in November and December and were given a gracious reception which was well reported in the Syrian press. Moslem groups, upon returning from tours of the Soviet Union, reported that Moslems there had "absolute freedom" and suggested that Syria could profit by Soviet experiences.<sup>25</sup>

But the real turning point in Soviet-Syrian relations was the election in September when the strength of the radicals increased. The Communist Party whose leader, Khaled Bakdash, was elected to Parliament, emerged as Syria's strongest party.<sup>26</sup> This result was greatly pleasing to the Soviet Union which continued all the while to warn the Syrians of Western intrigue and Turkish designs upon Syria.



### III 1955 Arms for Egypt

By 1955, a new Soviet line of policy with respect to the underdeveloped countries was in evidence. The new program had three aspects: an attempt to demonstrate the friendliness of the Soviet Union for the Arab states while maintaining an attitude of aloofness toward Israel; the desire of the Soviet Union to be recognized as a great power having a stake in any political settlements occurring in the Mid-East; the enhancement of Soviet influence in the area through her trading and aid policies.<sup>1</sup>

This program was not the result of conclusions drawn from Marxist-Leninist theory by the Soviet experts. While Soviet politicians were changing their methods, the experts on dogma continued their classic denunciations of Arab nationalism. But as it was, the experts still did not have cause to concoct fundamental and creative interpretations of Marx and Lenin, since the new Soviet policy did not apply to the whole area. Soviet policy toward Iran and Turkey remained the same while relations with Israel continued to decline. The Arabs were the great progressive people and even Marx had believed that some peoples were more advanced than others (dogmatically considered).<sup>2</sup>

From the viewpoint of strategy and security, there were two reasons for this Soviet policy toward the Arab states. The first was the desire to develop friendships with those countries which have adversaries in common with

the Soviet Union so that, if possible, the enemy could be surrounded. On the borders of the Soviet Union were Turkey and Iran, with Iraq not too distant. This meant that the largest Arab power should be cultivated as a potential friend and, in this case, the most likely prospect was Egypt.

The second reason for the new Soviet policy was to attempt the establishment of governments which would have ideological sympathy for Russia. This would mean the formation of Communist governments with Syria and Iraq being likely candidates for this possibility.<sup>3</sup> The strength of the Communists in these latter two countries gave rise to such a hope, but this is not to say that the governments of these countries were anxious to be in the Soviet camp. In fact, the Soviet Union had begun to choose sides, and it was now supporting Egypt in its quarrels with Iraq.

But at the start of 1955 the Soviets were not at all pleased with events occurring in Egypt. There were purges, arrests, and mass trials which were primarily directed against the Moslem Brotherhood, but which also snared some Communists. The Soviets were hesitant in commenting on these happenings, but they were not happy about them. However, trade relations continued to be normal, and some new agreements were signed with Hungary and Poland, and in March an industrial exhibition was held in Cairo under the sponsorship of Czechoslovakia.<sup>4</sup>

In January of 1955 Egypt had had disastrous flooding

resulting from heavy rains. The Soviets were quick to respond, and Ambassador Solod "expressed the Soviet government's sympathy to the Egyptian people ..... He also informed [the Egyptian Foreign Minister] that the U.S.S.R. Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has decided to send 60,000 rubles ..... to aid flood victims in Egypt".<sup>5</sup>

Also in January, the Soviet propaganda organs were busy trying to convince Syria that the imperialists were at the door and she had better beware. Pravda observed:

The inspirers of international provocations want to accomplish the same thing in Syria that they accomplished in Guatemala last year. Information has reached the press that the American plotters intend to use their usual tactics in Syria also. First, to provoke some sort of "strike" by armed bandits whom they have previously supplied with weapons through Iraq and Turkey, and in this way, to stir up disorder. Then the armed bandits are to proclaim the government "incapable" of coping with the situation in the country. Then follow the arrests of undesirable persons, etc...<sup>6</sup>

By the month of March the Russians were warning Syria that recent developments in that country were most unsatisfactory to Washington, London, and Ankara. "Open hatred is expressed toward the new Syrian government which has proclaimed the rejection of the military pacts and military aid of the imperialist powers". Turkey was accused of concentrating two divisions on the border in order to pressure the Syrian government and the Deputies in the parliament who supported el-Assali's government.<sup>7</sup>

As the month wore on, the Soviet press said the Turkish threat was increasing as the result of American efforts to

force Arab countries, particularly Syria, into a military pact.<sup>8</sup>

While the West was being denounced for its "pressure" to force Syria into a military pact, an event occurred which was to have no small effect upon Egypt's future policy. This was the savage and strong Israeli raid into Gaza. Egypt was too weak militarily to reply in kind, and this deficiency meant that arms must be had. Nasser did launch "commando" raids into Israel, but such activities were merely a cover for the fact that Egypt was too impotent to take more effective action.<sup>9</sup>

That same spring saw the formation of the Baghdad Pact, a factor which presented a serious problem to both the Soviet Union and Egypt. We have seen that Egypt, entertaining grandiose ideas about leading an Arab nation, was not happy with Iraq's willingness to accept Dulles' offer of military aid for defensive purposes. If Iraq was strengthened by the West, Egypt would have to compete with another Arab power for influence in the Mid-East.

The Prime Minister of Iraq had tried to interest Egypt in some type of defensive arrangement between the two, but Nasser vetoed the idea for the above reasons. This made Iraq join the Turkey-Pakistan Pact on February 24 and on April 5, Britain came into the treaty. The whole defensive grouping became known as the Baghdad Pact while in the Pact's namesake was established a Secretariat to coordinate activities.<sup>10</sup>

The reaction of Egypt was to launch a violent campaign of denunciation and vituperation against Iraq, Turkey, and the entire West while the response of the Soviet Union was somewhat more restrained and in the traditional manner of shock at imperialist exploitation.<sup>11</sup> The Pact, composed of the already mentioned countries, was soon joined by Iran, which made it an alliance of four underdeveloped countries with Turkey and Iran, bordering Russia's southern flank, being the heart of the arrangement. This meant that this important area was in the Western camp and could serve as a base in time of war against Russia.<sup>12</sup> The West could argue that these states were not strong enough to attack the Soviet Union, but as the latter saw things, the "imperialists" now had the legal right to establish offensive bases supplied with nuclear weapons which could inflict heavy damage upon Russia in short notice. Also, with a major power pledged to defend the countries along the Soviet's southern flank, her freedom of action in dealing with the Middle East was restricted.<sup>13</sup>

The official response of the Soviet Union to the formation of the Baghdad Pact came in a statement published in Pravda on April 17, 1955. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the West of "creating military groupings in the Near and Middle East like [those] in Southeast Asia (the so-called SEATO), [which] springs from the desire ... to bring these countries under

colonial enslavement." The Soviets asserted that the real purpose of these military pacts was to give the imperialists an opportunity to exploit the countries in the area. Although the Soviet Union seemed to be expressing their pity for the Middle Eastern countries because of their "enslavement", the statement went on to warn:

It goes without saying that the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to the situation taking shape in the Near and Middle East, since the formation of blocs and the creation of foreign military bases in Near and Middle Eastern countries have a direct bearing on the security of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government's position should be all the more understandable because the U.S.S.R. is situated in close proximity to these countries which cannot be said of other foreign powers, such as the U.S.A., which is thousands of kilometers away from this area.

Nonparticipation by Near and Middle Eastern countries in aggressive military blocs would be an important prerequisite for ensuring their security and the best guarantee against their involvement in dangerous military ventures.

The Soviet Government also made a proposal to the countries of the Middle East which gave a hint of Soviet policy to come. The Soviets declared their willingness to take a positive attitude toward these countries so as to strengthen their national independence and to promote friendly cooperation.

The Baghdad Pact had been designed to strengthen the so-called Northern Tier, but if it had been hoped that its influence would be extended, the dream was stillborn. The Soviet Union did not try to apply direct pressure to the countries in the Pact but sought to undermine the



Pact's strength by concentrating Soviet attention upon the rest of the Mid-East. The friendliness which the Soviet Union had promised came into being and the struggle between East and West was shifted to a different plane.<sup>14</sup>

The greatest enthusiasm which was expressed in favor of the Soviet declaration came from Syria. Farid el-Khani, in the name of the Syrian Government, "expressed gratitude to the Soviet Government in this delicate situation for the interest and attention it is showing in Near and Middle Eastern events and for the intention expressed by the Soviet Government to refer this matter to the United Nations if the Western Powers continue their pressure."<sup>15</sup> Clearly, the constant warnings of Western pressure by the Soviet press were having their effect upon Syria.

For strategic reasons, the Soviet Union had to halt the extension of pro-Western military power but there was no counter-force in the area upon which to rely. But there were possibilities in the fact that Iraq was the only Arab member of the Pact. Two goals of Soviet policy presented themselves: the alienation of the Iraqi people's loyalty from their government and toward Egypt; and the prevention of other Arab states joining the Baghdad Pact. If these two aims could be accomplished, Iraq's value as a Pact member would be materially lessened, and the Pact itself, vitiated.

Therefore, the first order of business for the Soviet Union was the enhancement of Egyptian prestige among the



Arabs. The Soviets did not try to establish a military base in Egypt to counter the Iraqis, although this may have been an ultimate goal. Rather, the Russians sought to keep the situation throughout the Middle East relatively fluid so as to have more freedom of movement. Iraq, if isolated, would probably gravitate back toward a more neutral position. If the Mid-East could be kept in a state of flux until the prestige of Egypt had been increased, the Arab states would come under its influence.<sup>16</sup>

Soviet wooing of Egypt had started even before the signing of the Baghdad Pact, when Russia realized that if Iraq moved West it would be Egypt which would react most violently. In March of 1955 Cairo concluded its talks with Syria concerning a defensive alliance. They had asked Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan to join, but the latter two countries refused. Saudi Arabia, however, was favorable.<sup>17</sup> This incident enabled the Soviet Union to judge the positions of the various Arab states and in those which were not pro-West, Soviet representatives were busy inviting people to visit Moscow, offering aid, and organizing exchanges.<sup>18</sup>

During April of 1955 the Bandung Conference had given the appearance that the underdeveloped countries were gradually moving toward a pro-Soviet standing. The Soviets looked forward to increased friendly contacts with countries containing great masses of potential Communist followers.<sup>19</sup> While at the Conference, Nasser

>

was outspoken in his anti-Western opinions and thereby ingratiated himself with the Russians. The Soviet bloc acknowledged the services of Nasser by purchasing large amounts of cotton which Egypt was having difficulty in selling. In 1953-1954 Egypt had exported 817,000 bales but in the following year, only 53,900. The purchases of the Soviet bloc went a long way in making up the deficit.<sup>20</sup>

Egyptian difficulties in selling her cotton crop in Western markets were the result of conditions in Europe. The post-World War II situation, economic policy, and overproduction in certain fields lessened the European demand for Middle Eastern products. Also, the diminished power of Europe in international affairs no longer allowed the old colonizers the freedom to direct the progress of the Mid-Eastern states. These factors gave the Arab states more freedom of movement to accept offers from the Soviet Union, as in the sale of Egyptian cotton.<sup>21</sup> In exchange, Egypt could receive armaments and producer goods. But, more than this temporary palliative, Egypt believed that in the future the Communist bloc would be more than happy to absorb the cotton production which could not be sold in the West. Perhaps this, more than anything, was the factor which moved Egypt toward the East.<sup>22</sup>

Such were the reasons for Egypt's pro-Soviet flirtation. Syria, on the other hand, moved East because of

domestic conditions. For example, her economic situation made the Soviet Union appear in the same light as that with which Egypt viewed the giant. Further, there were several strong pro-Soviet minorities in Syria such as the Kurds, the Armenians, and the Eastern Rite Christians. Finally, the fact that the Soviet Union had backed Syria in her arguments with pro-Western Turkey and Israel, was no small factor in Syria's Eastern orientation.<sup>23</sup>

But economic, technical, and political support are not the only reasons for the Arab's friendliness toward the Soviet Union. The sympathy which the Soviets express for the social problems of the area gives the Arabs the impression that the Russians are true friends. In the picture of the Soviet Union which the Arabs have, they see a country just emerging from a modernization process and with many unsolved problems, but which is still willing to do its bit for the downtrodden. By not using overt penetration but through economic assistance, the Soviet Union attempted to fulfill the esteemed role which the Arabs had cast for her.<sup>24</sup>

Perhaps the most important event of 1955 in Soviet-Arab relations was the sale of Czechoslovak arms to Egypt. Egypt was determined to increase her military strength after an Israeli attack on Gaza in February of 1955 had fully revealed the impotence of Nasser's domain. Hassen

Fahmi Ragab, the Egyptian Under-Secretary of War, was sent abroad to various Eastern and Western states for the purpose of buying arms. However, his mission was coolly received in the West, a fact which left no alternative as to where the arms must come from. On Egypt's initiative the matter was brought before the Soviet Ambassador, Daniel E. Solod, and within a few weeks, the Soviet Union offered surplus arms which could be paid for in installments. As negotiations became more serious, the American Ambassador was informed that unless Egypt could obtain arms from the United States, she would go to Russia. However, Nasser hesitated making a move toward the Soviet Union, no doubt because his opinion of that power had not changed much from that which he held previously. The United States agreed and presented Egypt with a list of those goods which it could purchase. Egypt could obtain twenty-seven million dollars worth of arms but the matter of payment was not acceptable to Nasser, especially since it appeared as though the Soviet Union would offer a better deal.

Egypt's Liberation day was celebrated on July 23, and for the occasion the Soviet Union sent a group of officials headed by Dimitri Shepilov, editor of Pravda. It may be that Shepilov was sent so that any talks with Nasser would not appear to be official and thus questioned at the Geneva Summit Conference which was underway at the same time.<sup>25</sup> Although it was suspected that something

serious was being discussed, no one could say that the topic was armament.

The next month Ambassador Solod invited Nasser to visit the Soviet Union; Nasser accepted and said he would come in the spring. But Nasser asserted that the visit did not mean "our anti-Communist principles" were being forgotten. Even so, Mr. Solod had assured him that the Soviet Union had no connection with the Communists in Egypt. "Nothing prevents us from strengthening our economic ties with Russia even if we arrest Communists at home and put them on trial".<sup>26</sup>

Izvestia explained the reason for the honoring of Nasser as follows:

Indeed, the peoples of Egypt and the Soviet Union do not have the same state system, and their social-political systems are different as well. But they have much in common, primarily their desire to live in peace and to base their relations with other nations on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Egypt is making great efforts to strengthen peace in the Near East by opposing the policy of forming military blocs in this area.<sup>27</sup>

The Soviet sale of arms to Egypt had been suspected, but it was not until September 27 that Nasser made it official when he announced the purchase at a military exhibition in Gezira. He excused the deal by telling of his constant attempts to buy in the West. But alas, the Americans and the French put forth terms which would have compromised Egypt's independence and dignity. Czechoslovakia had been the only one to make a reasonable offer. "This transaction [said Nasser] will have a purely

commercial character like any other commercial operation". He countered expected Western criticism by asserting that the arms deal did not mean Soviet domination of the Middle East, but it did signify the end of foreign control.<sup>28</sup>

The exact nature of the agreement was never publicized. However, some of the provisions were the delivery of a large number of MIG fighters, IL-28 bombers, guns, command cars, tanks, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank guns, bazookas, and other arms. For these, Egypt would pay with cotton and a small amount of cash. Each installment was to consist of 5% of Egypt's cotton export, the total value of each being worth about eighty million dollars.<sup>29</sup>

Reaction to the Soviet-Egyptian deal was mixed and depended upon various factors. Most agreed, however, that a new situation had arisen in spite of the fact that Egypt insisted the transaction was only commercial in character.<sup>30</sup> In the Middle East the arms deal was approved by public opinion and leaders alike, though whether or not some of the praise was sincere, is doubtful. Even Nuri as Said who was outspoken in his anti-Nasser opinions, felt compelled to offer his support. Overnight, Nasser's prestige underwent a sharp increase throughout the Middle East, and the Soviet Union received full credit for making the liberation of the Arabs a possibility.<sup>31</sup>

But there were signs that beneath the praise ran a current of fear and doubt as to whether Nasser could be trusted with all these arms. This may have influenced the



Iranian decision to join the Baghdad Pact on October 9, 1955, although the Foreign Ministry denied that such was the cause. And in December of 1955, Jordan announced its plan to join the Pact, a decision which had to be rejected when mob violence forced King Hussein to back down. Later, the British expressed the opinion that the riots were fomented by outside agitators, no doubt an allusion to Nasserites.<sup>32</sup>

As the West saw things, there was no danger in the arms deal per se, but there was the possibility that Egypt would find itself more and more dependent upon the Soviet Union. If Egypt's neutrality was compromised, it might move closer to the East and in turn, assume a more hostile attitude toward the West.<sup>33</sup>

Even though the Soviet Union had accomplished a commendable feat, it hesitated to announce the deed to the world. There were several reasons for the silence of the Soviet press. We have already mentioned the fact that Russia did not want to upset the proceedings at the Geneva Conference. Also, Moscow knew that its supplying arms to a military dictatorship would not be approved by radical non-Communist left-wing opinion outside of the Soviet bloc. The arms deal would tarnish the picture of the Soviet Union as the champion of peace among these leftist groups.<sup>34</sup>

On October 2, 1955 the Soviet Union, feeling that it could not remain silent forever, published a general statement excusing the action.



The Soviet Government believes that every state has the right to defend itself and to purchase weapons for its defense from other states on a normal commercial basis, and that no state has the right to interfere in this or to make any kind of unilateral demands violating the rights or interests of other states.<sup>35</sup>

There was, however, no mention of the political repercussions of the deal.

But Czechoslovakia, supposedly the country primarily responsible for the arms sale, was not as hesitant in praising the transaction. The Czechs praised Egypt for its support of a policy of "international cooperation and world peace". Orana Lidu blamed Israel for the tension with Egypt and said of Moshe Sharett's statement (that the arms deal would bring a deterioration of the Mid-Eastern situation), that it was "audacious and ridiculous".

It was not until November 1 that the Soviet Union spoke more freely of the arms deal. Russia placed the blame squarely upon Israel's shoulders and said the latter should not complain about its arms shortage since "its aggressive appeals did not reflect any shortage of arms". The Soviet press also said that the Three-Power Declaration of 1950 was now a dead issue since it had no legal foundation whatsoever. Israel was now attacked as the major cause of the Mid-Eastern troubles while Egypt was praised as having goals in common with the Soviet Union. "Both Egypt and the Soviet Union stand squarely on a platform of peace and oppose the policy of aggression".<sup>36</sup>

There are several questions which should be asked

at this point concerning the arms deal. For example, why did Egypt purchase arms from the Soviet Union?, and why did the Soviet Union sell them?

We have already mentioned the fact that the Western terms for the sale were not to Egypt's liking. Also, there was the Egyptian rivalry with Iraq for Arab leadership with the latter power being aided by the West.<sup>37</sup> Nasser had said that as a condition for the sale, Britain and the United States demanded Egyptian "membership in a security pact", while the Soviet Union had no such requirement in its package. He also stated that in spite of the deal, Egypt would not tolerate domestic Communism.

We are strong enough to cope with all internal subversion, including Communism. Communism is banned in Egypt. We have five or six underground Communist organizations, but we know all about them. They have no able leadership. Many other Communists are in prison.<sup>38</sup>

What was the effect of the Baghdad Pact upon Egypt's purchase of arms? Britain's Foreign Secretary held that the Pact had no effect since Soviet penetration of the area had been going on for some time. However, it must be remembered that Khrushchev had not succeeded Malenkov as the real Soviet leader until February 1955. A new turn in policy as reflected by the arms deal would not seem to have been a Malenkov, but rather a Khrushchev, decision. Therefore, it would appear to have been the case that the idea of an arms deal came after the formation of the Baghdad Pact.<sup>39</sup> For Nasser the Pact was a strong challenge to his influence in the Mid-East. Such

an alliance would split the Arab world into two, thus putting a crimp into any plan for Arab unity. The Pact was not a threat to Egyptian security but it was a block to Nasser's grandiose plans.

There was also discussed above the attack in Gaza by Israel in February of 1955 and this was the reason most often given by Egyptian spokesmen for the necessity of arms. But this was only one reason out of many. For many years Egypt had been thinking of the possible benefits in a Soviet connection. During the early 1950's the Wafd had given serious thought to the idea as being a way of ending Egyptian dependence upon the West. It would seem as though this earlier version was based upon a desire to spite the former colonizers rather than a rational decision made in the best interests of Egypt.

For Egypt, the arms deal meant the end of the period in which there was an exclusive concern with domestic problems. Nasser and Naguib had come to power on a platform of domestic reforms with national prestige to be considered at a later date. By 1955, rival political parties had been eliminated and the "new" Egypt created. The arms deal signified that the house had been put in order and Egypt was ready to move on to bigger things.<sup>40</sup>

The Soviet Union also received great benefit from the sale. There were several factors which made the time propitious for a more active Mid-Eastern policy. For one, there was no international organization to which

countries like Syria and Egypt could turn for aid in selling cotton surpluses. Coincidentally, the years 1955 and 1956 saw a shortage in Soviet cotton production, and this deficiency also had effects in the satellites. Thus, the sale of about \$250 million worth of arms in exchange for cotton was a ready made answer for both Egyptian and Soviet problems.<sup>41</sup>

Another Soviet benefit was that opinion in the Arab states was favorable, for these people now felt that Russia would fulfill their desires on reasonable terms without them giving away their pride and honor by accepting "conditions". In turn, this meant that Soviet overtures for trade would be more readily accepted in the area. Also, since Egypt had committed her future cotton production to payment for the arms, the Soviet Union had a lever to push in case of policy differences.<sup>42</sup>

In terms of strategic alignment, the arms sale meant that the Soviets had again taken an active interest in the Middle East after a period of relative inactivity. The arms clause of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 had indeed been overridden as the Soviet press said it had, and this in turn meant that Israel had lost a certain measure of security. Israel, to compensate, was receiving arms from France and the former country began to think seriously of a preventive war. Further pleasure for the Soviets was supplied by the reaction of the United States which was very disturbed by the sale. Dulles was moved

to remark, "The issue was, do nations which play both sides get better treatment than nations which are stalwart with us?" But such statements did not halt negotiations between Egypt and Britain for the sale of cotton nor did it stop Egyptian talks with both Britain and the United States for aid in construction of the Aswan Dam.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, the sale meant that the more anti-Western nations had a rallying point around which gathered Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. This group could conceivably have been developed - if all had gone well - into a counterweight to the Pact powers of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and Britain.<sup>44</sup>

With the conclusion of the arms deal, the Soviet Union experienced new attitude toward Egypt. No longer was Nasser a "fascist" or a "reactionary", instead, the anti-Communist activities of the Egyptian Government were ignored. Diplomatic and Trade missions from the Soviet bloc countries became active in the Middle East.

But beneath all the apparent harmony, there were factors which would cause some friction in the years to come. For one thing, Cairo and Moscow would not always have the same aims. The primary Arab concern was Israel and pan-Arabism. But the Soviet Union was not too concerned with Israel and did not feel all the effort expended for its destruction worthwhile. The main cause of Soviet-Arab friction would be the fact that Moscow did

not relish the idea of a unified Arab state on its southern flank.<sup>45</sup>

However, such thoughts about the future did deter the present love affair. In September of 1955, there was held the grand opening of a "permanent" VOKS exhibit in Cairo. For the occasion the highest ranking Egyptian dignitaries presented themselves, while the Soviet Union commissioned a VOKS "plenipotentiary" for Egypt.<sup>46</sup> Egypt was invited to send a delegation of physicians and journalists to Moscow, and on September 6, 1955, a trade deal was announced involving Egyptian rice for Soviet petroleum.<sup>47</sup>

Syria, following the Egyptian example, started talks for the purchase of arms in November 1955. These were delivered in March 1956 by Czechoslovakia, and in quality and type, were similar to those received by Egypt. Soviet instructors trained Syrian pilots in Egypt, and many Soviet technicians soon were living in Syria. Syria now took on importance as a Soviet depot of arms for the Middle East. Latakia was made into a port from which arms made their way throughout the Middle East, while it was planned to construct a submarine base near the port. The Soviet Embassy in Syria had an increase in staff of five times, plus three military attaches.<sup>48</sup> Thus, it would appear as though Syria was fast becoming more amenable to Soviet influence than was Egypt.

As a first reaction to the Soviet moves in the Middle East, the United States sought to regain some influence



by offering financial assistance to Egypt for its Aswan Dam project.<sup>49</sup> The Aswan Dam was a serious project upon which Nasser based the prestige of his whole economic and social policy. Nasser may have been unrealistic in expecting Britain and the United States to come through with aid for such a project, especially in view of his arms purchase and attacks on the Baghdad Pact. Nevertheless, he did get an offer from the West of a \$70 million loan which was conditional upon Egypt getting another loan of \$200 million from the International Bank.<sup>50</sup>

But the loan, which was offered in December of 1955, was not immediately accepted by Egypt. It seemed as though Nasser was again looking to the Soviet Union for a better deal and in the months to come, the Egyptian strategy of playing both sides would become quite evident.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, by the end of 1955, new vistas had opened for the Soviet and new headaches were given to the West. A new strategy had been launched by Nikita Khrushchev which took a more realistic view of the nature of the underdeveloped countries but which contradicted many interpretations of Marx-Lenin. The next chapter shall examine how these doctrinal difficulties were resolved.



IV Ideological Reinterpretation

The year 1956 was very important, for the application of Communist ideology was re-evaluated and new theories were developed. In 1956 was held the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union during which some friendly underdeveloped countries received many compliments.

That same year the oriental authority Zhukov, also praised those countries which had thrown off their imperialist yoke, but he warned that their so-called socialist programs should not be confused with the Soviet variety. He asserted that "the active role of the working class and of its militant advanced guard, the Communist Party, is increasing everywhere; it is natural, therefore, to expect that in the future the working class will achieve universal predominance in their struggle. This, however, is a long and complicated process."<sup>1</sup>

The underdeveloped countries were now considered to have a progressive function even though they were not perfect, i.e. Communist. Behind this change in opinion of the role of countries such as Egypt, lay a deeper ideological foundation. In the opinion of the Communists, the non-Communist states of Asia and Africa could be divided into three categories. Those that are independent and neutralist are regarded as being "genuinely" independent. Then there are those sovereign states which

have joined alliances with the West and these are not considered independent; at most, they are semi-colonies, and victims of indirect imperialism. Finally, there are the colonies still under the control of European powers.

Although a state such as Egypt considers itself to be following a socialist pattern, the Soviet Union would have disagreed with this. Alexander Guber has stated, "We should not be misled by the adoption of programs for the 'building of a society of the Socialist type,' for the 'building of Socialism,' by the Socialist names taken by the bourgeois parties, etc.". The authority Balabuskevitch has argued that the national bourgeoisie was stepping up its efforts to steer the masses from the true course and into their own channels. He claimed that the national bourgeoisie has tried to counteract the spread of Marxist ideas by representing itself as the true exponent of national interest. "The achievement in certain countries of state-Capitalist measures, and the presence of elements of economic planning, are advanced as proof of development along a Socialist path, but one which takes account of national peculiarities".

However, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, these states are still not truly free in that, though they have secured differing degrees of political independence, they are still economically dependent upon foreign capital. The Soviet Union claims that the main goal for these states must be economic independence, by which is meant the expropriation of Western capital and the cessation of

economic ties with the West.

Although foreign investment by capitalistic states is considered to be evil, the Soviet Union still approves of state-Capitalistic enterprises in the new states.

Zhukov has said:

Given a comparatively low level of economic and technological development in the East - not for nothing is the term "underdeveloped" frequently applied to these countries - and given the economic diversity of these countries, the progressive tendency toward the transformation of the state (more correctly the state-Capitalist) sector of the economies of the non-Socialist countries of the East into an important factor strengthening their economies and sovereignty should not be underrated.<sup>2</sup>

This, then, was the new insight gained in 1956 by the Soviet Union, namely, that though the Capitalist system in the world was in a state of crisis, the bourgeoisie of certain countries such as Egypt could still play a progressive role. The Soviet Eastern authorities were not thinking in terms of economic expansion, but in terms of the socio-political situation in the Orient. The Western bourgeoisie, they said, had used up its usefulness and potentialities as far as the organization of production was concerned. In the East, however, there were still remnants of feudalism, and the fight against them is the task of the national bourgeoisie. In the nineteenth century the bourgeoisie acted as the force ending what was left of feudalism, and in the twentieth century, the Eastern national bourgeoisie shall fulfill the same role.<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, the present role of the Eastern bourgeoisie

must be to back up a strongly anti-Western foreign policy. This group must become anti-imperialist while at the same time remaining an exploiting class, the enemy of the Communist Party. But what exactly is the national bourgeoisie? This group has been defined by A. I. Levkovsky as that section of the local bourgeoisie for whom "national capitalist production is the foundation of its existence." He drew a distinction between the "usurer merchant bourgeoisie" and the "comprador bourgeoisie." The national bourgeoisie included some sections of the monopolist bourgeoisie. According to I. M. Reisner, the monopoly interests have a double character, "On the one hand, they represent forms of Capitalism that exhibit decay and parasitism and hinder Capitalist development; at the same time, they show themselves to be bearers of an extremely important entrepreneurship."

However, there is no satisfactory social or economic basis by which one could define the national bourgeoisie. The problem, as has been mentioned, is political and therefore, those bourgeoisie supporting the policies of the Soviet Union are the more progressive element.<sup>4</sup>

This was quite a development, although it is arguable whether this is good Marxism. These arguments have been used concerning the bourgeois elements in past debates, but different conclusions were drawn. One past counter-argument was that the national bourgeoisie was unwilling and incapable of removing the feudal elements and that

they would be more afraid of local workers than international imperialists. But if the present day experts are correct, it is by virtue of the fact that they had taken cognizance of the political, rather than the economic, trends. Some of their present day assumptions are, of course, well-founded. For example, the expectation that a policy of statism would prepare the way for a non-Capitalist social order when the ranks of the industrial working class had been swelled, thereby giving a strong boost to the class struggle while halting the further growth of the national bourgeoisie. At present, however, the interests of the bourgeoisie and the interests of the people coincided, and so the former group had a progressive role to play. But this unity could never be complete, and thus could not last forever. But what the Soviet experts never answered in 1956 was: what independent action should be taken by the progressive forces against the national bourgeoisie if the unity of interest would disappear? And when, under what conditions, would the national bourgeoisie cease to fulfill its progressive function?

Undoubtedly, the present state of affairs was not entirely to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union. The present foreign policy of the national bourgeoisie is not pro-Soviet and did not always objectively follow the interests of the Soviet Union. The ideological justifications were useful only during the immediate stage, with

the hope that such doctrinal changes would pave the way for a more favorable future. Theoretically - Marxist style - it is not possible for the leaders of underdeveloped countries to build a truly Socialist society, and sooner or later this bourgeois class must be eliminated. For the present they fulfill their task; in the future, history shall demand their removal. However, how this was to be done was not said.<sup>5</sup>

For the time being, we must overlook the capitalist element which has been emphasized by the Soviet Union. It could be argued, in fact, that what the Soviet Union is attempting to do is to attract the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy, and that their appeals to certain sections of the bourgeoisie are not in earnest. Perhaps they feel that the intelligentsia's indignation and sense of shame at the poverty of their country has made that group fertile soil for political agitation. The intellectuals in underdeveloped countries have a desire to serve the people and to lift them out of poverty, but this very same group has an interest in obtaining material rewards and social status commensurate with what they believe to be their value. Such people believe that the intellectuals should be the ruling group heading a society based upon scientific and rational principles; therefore, the appeal of Marxism. The appeal of Communism for this group is quite strong as it attracts both their desire to serve and their will to dominate.



Also, the appeal of Marxism is strong in that sector which is known as the bureaucracy. Here we must distinguish between colonial and independent countries, and between traditionalist and democratic regimes. There is no appeal in Communism for the administrations nurtured by European imperialist powers. But in those independent Asian states which have a relatively democratic system of government, the appeal of Communism is quite great. There are two elements of appeal, namely idealism and ambition with more emphasis on the second. The Soviet Union, by approving such trends as state-Capitalism, makes an **es**pecially good impression upon the bureaucracy, for it is they, and not the private capitalists, whose interests are bound up in such enterprises. When the Soviet Union offers to give loans and set up factories, this bureaucratic group is most affected by such developments.<sup>6</sup>

The ideological developments discussed above will help to illuminate the theory behind the trade and aid program of the Soviet Union. However, it would not be true to say that Soviet policy follows the ideology since, as we have seen, the re-evaluation of theory followed the trading programs launched by Russia since the death of Stalin.



V 1956: Suez

In January and February of 1956 the United States, Britain, and France held conferences on the general Mid-Eastern situation. Several proposals were offered, one of which called for the sending of military forces and arms to Israel and the dispatch of naval units to the area. The Soviet Union was not consulted about these matters since its actions had caused friction in the area and any appeal would have been futile. In any event, the most likely course of Soviet action would have been to suggest referring the matter to the United Nations where a Soviet veto could have made short work of any Western proposal. The result of the conferences was that Dag Hammerskjold, the Secretary General of the United Nations, was asked to visit the Middle East, talk to the Arabs and Israelis, and see what he could do to lessen tension. This he did and achieved some success for which the Soviet Union took credit claiming that tension had been lowered through its actions.<sup>1</sup>

At this time, the West had three policy goals in the Middle East. These were: the creation of friendly relations and a cooperative attitude in the countries in the area; the creation of defensive alliances in the area so as to prevent its becoming of strategic advantage to the Soviet Union; and the continued exploitation of the area's oil deposits. The attainment of these objectives was in

part conditioned upon an influx of capital into the area ~~X~~ so that the oil deposits could be developed and a friendly attitude created by an aid program.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet policy, on the other hand, strove to assert Russian power and prestige throughout the Middle East. The Soviet Union was concerned by the fact that the West did not take note of Russian interests in the Mid-East. For example, in February 1956, the United States and Britain reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 which asserted their responsibility for developments in the area. The Soviets responded by calling the Declaration a "spurious document" which was "colonialist", "imperialist", and dead.<sup>3</sup> And when the suggestion was made to send military forces into the Mid-East, the Soviet Foreign Ministry asserted:

The moving of troops into the territories of the countries of the Near and Middle East would represent an act clearly contrary to the interest of strengthening peace, which would create a seat of dangerous friction and tension in the aforementioned areas.....

The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs deems it necessary to state again that any action leading to complications in the area of the Near and Middle East and to increased tension in that area is bound to be a subject of legitimate concern on the part of the Soviet Government.<sup>4</sup>

Egypt, after the events of 1955, declared that its policy was one of "positive neutralism", and thus would not favor either East or West. However, in spite of such assertions, Egypt had been drawn quite close to the Soviet bloc while friction with the West was pronounced. The Egyptian press constantly denounced the Western reaction

to the arms deal with the result being more tension.<sup>5</sup>

Friction between the Arabs and Israel had generated much heat during the early months of 1956. Bloody border clashes and retaliation were frequent and a war looked to be a good possibility. The situation was made more precarious by the realization that the Arabs could receive Soviet support. But this support was not pro-Arab to the extent that the Soviet Union would have countenanced an Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow had supplied Egypt with arms as an anti-Western measure, and did not want them used for what it considered to be a petty quarrel.<sup>6</sup> What friction there was in the area the Soviet Union tried to place responsibility for it on the West.

When the attempt to force the Arab countries into the Baghdad pact met with a stubborn resistance, certain Western Powers proceeded to fan the Arab-Israeli conflict which their own policy had originally provoked, encouraging Israel to violate the armistice agreement..... Irritated by their failure, the Western imperialist circles decided to resort to military intervention, using the artificially provoked Arab-Israeli conflict as a pretext. The hypocritical talk about "the necessity to stop the fighting" served merely to camouflage the intervention planned in the interests of the oil monopolies which reap fabulous profits by exploiting the resources of the Middle East.<sup>7</sup>

While charges and counter-charges made their way back and forth, the Soviet Union continued its aid programs. In February Egypt signed an agreement with Russia calling for the establishment of a nuclear laboratory in Cairo which would be staffed by Soviet advisers and Egyptian scientists trained in the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup>

On the eve of the visit to Britain by Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin the Soviet Union launched a peace drive in the Mid-East. A statement was published on April 17, which took a mild stand on the situation in the area and called for "a peaceful solution in accordance with the national interests of all countries concerned."<sup>9</sup> The statement contained several comments which highly displeased the Arabs such as the support offered the strengthening of the integrity of all Mid-Eastern nations, Israel included. The Soviet Union held that there must be no armed conflict in the area, and it asked "the interested parties to refrain from any kind of action which may lead to an exacerbation of the situation on the existing demarcation line set up by truce agreements between the Arab countries and Israel." It was also suggested that there be a compromise between the Arabs and Israelis "on a mutually acceptable basis, taking due consideration of the just national interests of the interested parties." Such a solution would have meant Arab recognition of Israel and a peace treaty.<sup>10</sup> It is no wonder that the Arabs were upset at such an apparent about-face on the part of the Soviet Union.

There were other signs that Russia was pressing for a compromise. For example, the Soviet United Nations delegate, Arkadii Sobolev, remarked to Israeli ambassador, Abba Eban, that Russia had some proposals to help ease the Arab-Israel conflict. These proposals were never

revealed but there were comments in the leftist press of Egypt and Europe which hinted at what they might be.

Yussef Hilmi, a supporter of Egyptian Communism, wrote an article in a French journal calling for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a just peace, and the silencing of radicals in both camps. Also, articles printed the very same week in Rose al Yussef and the London Daily Worker made the same plea.<sup>11</sup> All of these definitely point to the fact that the Soviet Union did not want to be compelled to support the Arabs if they went to war with Israel. These hints by the Soviets show that a Middle Eastern war was not in the Soviet Union's plans and the Arabs had better note that they might not receive Russian support if a war did develop.

When Khurshchev and Bulganin arrived in Britain for the talks, they were accused by Prime Minister Eden of increasing the danger of war in the Middle East by their supplying arms to Arab countries. The Russians replied by denouncing the Baghdad Pact and the arms shipments to Pact members. Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union would halt its arms shipments if the West did likewise. He also proposed a United Nations supervised general embargo on arms shipments to the area. This Soviet plan was rejected because, had it been accepted, it would have meant the end of the Baghdad Pact, the isolation of the Arab states, and the possibility of continued arms shipments to Egypt by way of Communist China, which is not a

United Nations member.

During the talks Eden warned his guests that Britain would use force if necessary to preserve the status quo, which prompted Khrushchev to reply in kind. The result of the talks was negligible and the official communique simply stated that both powers would "do everything in their power to facilitate the maintenance of peace and security in the Near and Middle East .... The governments of the two countries call on the states concerned to take measures to prevent the increase of tension; ..."

The talks with Eden and the launching of the peace drive were both failures for Soviet policy. The Arabs were angered at the Soviet suggestion that they should compromise with Israel. Also, they now knew that they could not count on Soviet support for any adventures they might launch against Israel. Egypt, in particular, did not like Russia holding talks with Britain concerning Arab affairs without having first consulted Cairo. Even more, the fact that the Soviet Union had spoken favorably of an arms embargo meant that Egypt might lose the future support of that great power for Nasser's dream of Egyptian hegemony in the Arab bloc.

Egyptian dissatisfaction over the new Soviet attitude may have been in part, a cause for Nasser's recognition of Communist China in May 1956. One Egyptian official remarked that Egypt "could get all the arms needed from Communist China even if the U.N. imposed an embargo on



weapons to the Middle East." An article in Al Gumhuria stated:

Gamal Abdel Nasser has recognized China and dealt a blow to the projected western blockade of the Arab states .... People's China is the biggest producer of armament at present and can supply the Arabs all the war material they need. Thus, Gamal Abdel Nasser put Eden's noose around Eden's own neck.<sup>12</sup>

No doubt such comments were aimed as much at the Soviet Union as they were at the West.

The Soviet Union, realizing that it had erred, did what it could to recoup its losses. In June, Demitri T. Shepilov, now the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited Egypt. An article appeared in Pravda commenting upon the visit and hinting that the Soviets were ready to appease the wrath of the Arabs. It said:

The Soviet Union, a developed industrial power, is giving Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon technical aid in creating new enterprises and is supplying them with equipment and machines on mutually advantageous, purely commercial terms. It is natural that further expansion of economic ties between our countries, for which great potentialities exist, corresponds to the requirements of both countries ....<sup>13</sup>

On June 18, Shepilov made a speech calling for the principles of solidarity expressed at Bandung the year before. He assured his listeners that Russia had no ambitions in the Mid-East and said that the Soviet peoples would be "good friends and companions". Shepilov also promised Soviet support for the Arab drive to eliminate poverty and develop their political institutions.<sup>14</sup>

But Shepilov did not come to Egypt simply to make

speeches; Soviet relations with that country had to be repaired. Egypt was close to agreement with the United States on a loan for the Aswan project and the Soviets had to counter this expected increase in American influence. Such a project would mean that the United States would be active in Egypt for about ten years, a long time in which to draw Nasser Westward. Thus Shepilov came to Egypt with offers of Soviet financial and industrial aid.<sup>15</sup> Commenting on the conversations, Nasser later said:

Shepilov announced the willingness of the U.S.S.R. to render economic assistance to Egypt including long-term credits. He said that any kind of aid would be granted by the Soviet Union without conditions. Shepilov told me: We don't try to get raw materials, because we have our own raw materials.<sup>16</sup>

However, the Soviet Union did not mention the possibility of its financing the Aswan Dam, most likely because it would have been too much for Soviet resources to handle. Also, Egypt could not have repaid the loan in the usual period allowed by the Soviet Union for payment.

Yet, the United States was not a reliable alternative loan agency for the Aswan project. Nasser was denouncing the British and French too vehemently, and expressing too much sympathy for the Soviet Union. The recognition of Communist China, the trade with Russia's satellites, Egypt's growing indebtedness to the Soviets, were factors militating against a favorable American reaction to Egypt's request for aid. Also, the West could not be sure that Egypt could fulfill the conditions of the loan; namely, could Egypt raise her \$900 million share. The

United States decided that it would be best to reject the Egyptian request, which it did on July 19.<sup>17</sup>

Refused by both East and West in his appeal for aid, Nasser found a ready means of revenge: he nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. His decision to do so was announced in a speech he gave on that day. He promised that the Suez Canal Company would receive compensation and also that shipping operations would continue as before. Britain and France, the two countries having the greatest interest in the canal, denounced the action while the Arabs looked on somewhat approvingly.<sup>18</sup>

On July 29, the American Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mr. Murphy, met in London with the British and French Foreign Ministers. Already the French and British had taken precautionary measures to meet any eventuality arising out of the crisis. The next day, Sir Anthony Eden delivered a short address in the House of Commons declaring that Britain found it impossible to acquiesce in a plan which put the operations and control of the Suez Canal into the hands of any one country. Later, it was revealed that the British War Office had put into effect "certain precautionary measures of a military nature."<sup>19</sup>

The Soviet Union quickly responded by falling behind Egypt. On July 31, Premier Khrushchev gave a speech in Moscow in which he said that "the nationalization of the

Suez Canal is an act to which a sovereign government such as the Egyptian government has a right." He also called attention to Egypt's declared intention to respect freedom of shipping and to compensate the Suez Canal Company for its loss.<sup>20</sup>

On August 2, London announced the decision to call for a conference of those Powers having an interest in the Canal, for the purpose of drawing up an international administration. Twenty-four Powers in all were to attend the conference, hosted by Britain, France, and the United States and which would convene in London August 16.<sup>21</sup>

The Soviet Union, on August 9, responded to the invitation to attend by declaring that Egypt was correct in her actions and that any British-French military preparations should cease. The Soviets also protested the holding of such a conference and said, "The Soviet Government considers that the above mentioned conference cannot in any way be regarded, either in its composition or in character and purpose, as an international meeting authorized to take any decisions whatever in the Suez Canal."<sup>22</sup>

Nasser, also, did not accept the British plan for a conference. He told reporters that he could agree to a conference only if the purpose would be to alter the 1888 Canal convention and to replace it by another. Since Britain insisted on its own purposes for the conference, Egypt would not attend. And on the date the London Conference was to convene, the Arabs showed their displeasure

by staging a general strike in Egypt as well as lesser ones in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and Jordan.<sup>23</sup>

The Conference met only to find itself deadlocked over which of two proposals expressed the opinion of those present. The Dulles proposal, supported by eighteen of the nations present, called for

Institutional arrangements for cooperation between Egypt and other interested nations in the operation, maintenance and development of the Canal and for harmonizing and safeguarding their respective interests in the Canal. To this end, operating, maintaining, and developing the Canal and enlarging it so as to increase the volume of traffic in the interest of world trade and of Egypt would be the responsibility of a Suez Canal Board. Egypt would grant this Board all rights and facilities appropriate to its functioning as here outlined.<sup>24</sup>

The second proposal was that submitted by Menon, the Indian delegate, and this received the support of four countries, including the Soviet Union. Under this plan, any negotiations had to be based upon the fact that Egypt had sovereign control of the Canal and that any group created to represent international interest in the Canal would simply be consultative and advisory in nature.<sup>25</sup> If this plan had won unanimous acceptance, it would have meant that Egypt would come away from the struggle with complete ownership, burdened only by a noisome body of advisors. Nasser would have greatly enhanced his prestige; Britain and France would be booted out of Egypt; and the Soviet Union would appear as the great backer of Arab aspirations. Three days of debate failed to break the eighteen to four split. Finally, the majority

decided to depute five representatives to Nasser for the purpose of presenting him with the proposals agreed upon by the group of eighteen. The proposals of this group, as expected, were rejected by Nasser.

The opinion of the Soviet press was that the Dulles plan "would in fact mean the establishment of a definite form of colonialism in the now independent Republic of Egypt." The editorial went on to claim that the West tried to split the Conference into two groups for the purpose of making the claim that the Dulles plan was the will of the Conference.<sup>26</sup>

The Soviet Union added more of its weight to the controversy by a series of letters to Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet. The content of these letters appears to show that the Soviet Union had become alarmed at the possibilities for military measures in the Middle East. Bulganin, in a somewhat mild tone, pointed out the dangers inherent in an attack on Egypt. He declared that it was none of the Soviet Union's doing in nationalizing the Suez Canal and further remarked, "we learned about the nationalization . . . . only from the radio".<sup>27</sup> But he also added the warning: "Egypt cannot be defeated, nor can Algeria. I must declare to you, Mr. Prime Minister, that the Soviet Union, as a great power which is interested in the maintenance of peace, cannot stand aside from this question."<sup>28</sup>

But Britain was not yet finished with Nasser. The British withdrew the pilots from the Canal; however, Egypt



got replacements. Next, the attempt was made to have those using the Canal to continue their payments to the Suez Canal Company, but because of insufficient backing from the United States, this plan did not work out.

Still other attempts were made to solve the Suez problem. In an address to the House of Commons on September 12, Anthony Eden presented a plan agreed upon by Britain, France, and the United States, which called for an association of Suez Canal Users. He explained the plan as an association of the Canal users employing pilots, and having responsibility for the maintenance of traffic flow through the Canal. Egypt would be asked to cooperate with the group and would receive payment according to the facilities which were provided. The dues, however, would go to the association, and not to Egypt. In the event that Egypt refused to accept the User's Authority, a breach of the 1888 Convention would be declared and the necessary measures would be taken to ensure the Authority's control.<sup>29</sup>

Whether or not the User's Authority could be justified by the 1888 Convention is doubtful, but Britain still wanted international control of the Canal. However, whatever possibilities the plan might have had were killed when Dulles declared that the Authority would have American support, but not to the extent of forcing Egypt to acquiesce.<sup>30</sup>

Yet, Britain went ahead with the idea and called for a conference of those eighteen nations which had supported

the Dulles Plan at the London talks. But this time the same countries were not favorable to the idea as envisaged by Britain. A User's Authority was established but was weakened by the provision that, if a country saw fit, it could pay the dues to Egypt.<sup>31</sup> Thus, Britain and France were again thwarted.

By September 20, Izvestia was saying that the aggressive West had failed in its plot. "It can be said without exaggeration that the supporters of a policy of force in the Suez question have met with such opposition to their adventurous schemes that they are beside themselves."

Britain and France played another card, though they would have preferred to do otherwise. They requested a Security Council meeting on September 26, so that the situation could come before the United Nations. Trud replied, "It is not the 'threat to navigation', not the 'concern for economic ties' which frighten the monopolists, but the possible nationalization of oil companies, .... anti-imperialist movements ....., and the loss of prestige".<sup>32</sup> The Soviet Union began to attack the West quite vehemently and presented the Suez crisis as a black versus white affair.

In the Security Council, Britain asked that the United Nations assume an important role in the administration of the Suez Canal. But, as could be expected, Russia vetoed the idea of a User's Association.

By mid-October there seemed to be a lull in the storm.

Operations at the Canal were going smoothly and the Canal users were accustomed to Egyptian ownership. But the calm was broken when the Soviet Union warned of possible Western military intervention. On October 27, Tass reported:

According to information received from Tel Aviv, a new military provocation is under preparation in Israel. Israeli authorities are hastily mobilizing reservists ... Artillery and tankmen are among those being called. Large numbers of passenger cars, buses, delivery trucks, trucks and even taxis are being mobilized.

The Soviet Union should have been careful in placing the blame upon Israel for the **mob**ilization measures. Between October 11 and 29, there were many violent border raids launched against Israel which, in turn, took reprisals against Jordan. On the 14th of October, it was reported that two Egyptian commandos were killed in Negev. The Truce Supervisor for the United Nations, General Burns, expressed the opinion that a disastrous frontier situation would occur and he believed the present situation to be the worst in two years. He placed responsibility upon "Jordanian infiltration combined with the Israeli policy of severe retaliation."<sup>33</sup>

On October 28, the Israeli Government announced that "as a precautionary measure to safeguard her borders" the Cabinet had authorized the recall of several battalions of reservists. Israel claimed the action was necessary because of the commando raids by Egyptians working out of Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. Undoubtedly, the reservists

had been called up sometime before the announcement, because on October 29 Israeli troops crossed the Egyptian border and kept on going. The Israeli Foreign Ministry said they had taken "the necessary measures to destroy Egyptian commando bases in the Sinai peninsula".<sup>34</sup>

The next day Britain handed both the Egyptian and Israeli ambassadors in London an ultimatum which declared that Britain and France would take up positions in the Suez Canal zone if hostilities were not immediately stopped. In an address to Parliament, Anthony Eden defended the ultimatum as a necessity if safety of passage through the Canal was to be guaranteed. He also said that the Egyptian Government had been requested to grant the Anglo-French forces permission to occupy positions at Port Said, Ismaila, and Suez.

Nasser immediately rejected the ultimatum and appealed to the Security Council for an immediate consideration of the Anglo-French threat. Britain and France, true to their word sent their forces into the Canal area, much to the dismay of the United States. President Eisenhower thought the action a mistake and said, "In the circumstances .... there will be no United States involvement in these present hostilities".<sup>35</sup>

The Soviet press swung into action by accusing Britain and France of brazen aggression and of attempting to restore colonial oppression in the East. Premier Bulganin asked Nehru of India to agree to a second Bandung conference

on the Canal crisis and President Voroshilov made the same request of President Sukarno. Both Asian leaders rejected the Soviet proposals, while Nehru even urged Bulganin to avoid "any step that could lead to a world war."<sup>36</sup> Pravda remarked indignantly:

Flouting the U.N. Charter and the foundations of international law, the Anglo-French imperialists have begun their intervention against the independent Egyptian republic, in an effort to seize the Suez Canal by military force and to impose their occupation on Egypt. This is being done at a time when all the prerequisites had been created for a peaceful solution of the Suez problem, in accord with the wishes of all peace-loving peoples, by the recent discussions of the problem in the Security Council.<sup>37</sup>

On November 2, the United Nations General Assembly, by a 64 to 5 vote, approved a resolution offered by Mr. Dulles, calling for an end to military activity and a cease-fire. Britain and France were now isolated. Not only was their ally condemning their actions, but there were domestic outcries in both their countries denouncing the invasion.

The Soviet Union was backing Egypt as much as possible short of military measures. There was a drive throughout the Soviet Union to round up wheat, medical supplies and various other goods for Egypt. The Soviet Government also dispatched a series of letters, dated November 5, to Eisenhower, Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion. The letter to Eisenhower made the suggestion that Russia and the United States resolve to oppose the attack. This, it was said, would stop the aggression and no war would occur.

Bulganin also suggested that both powers use their forces in the area, under United Nations direction, to guarantee the stopping of the aggression.<sup>38</sup> Undoubtedly, this suggestion had to be pure propaganda. If the United States refused, as the Soviets knew it would, the claim could be made that America condoned the aggression. The other letters were similar to that sent to Anthony Eden, which warned that the Soviet Union was

fully determined to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the East through the use of force.

We hope at this critical moment you will display due prudence and draw the corresponding conclusions from this.<sup>39</sup>

But such warnings were not taken seriously because of the Soviet statement that military activity against the aggressors should be taken under United Nations auspices.

Meanwhile, in the United Nations, Canada offered a resolution suggesting that an international military force of the United Nations be set up and sent into Egypt to supervise the ending of hostilities. Egypt approved of the idea and the General Assembly voted its approval on November 7. Kuznetsov, the Soviet delegate, abstained on the grounds that such an international force would only take the Suez Canal away from the sovereign control of the Egyptians.<sup>40</sup>

In the November 7 issue of Pravda, there was published an "Appeal of the Egyptian Government." In the article, Egypt made an appeal to "all people throughout the world who still respect human dignity and justice,"



asking for volunteers, arms and other support. The Soviet Union responded, but not until it was too late; for on November 8 Israel announced that she was withdrawing her troops from Egyptian territory and would accept the presence of the United Nations military mission. The next day Anthony Eden reported to the House of Commons that Britain welcomed the Israeli decision and added that Britain would hand over the responsibilities assumed by her forces in the area just as soon as the United Nations forces were in a position to maintain normal operations.

Now that the invaders had decided to withdraw their forces, the Soviet Union began to step-up its threatening attacks in the press. November 10 saw the issuance of a Soviet statement which expressed the sympathy felt by the Soviet people for the Egyptians fighting for their independence and freedom. The statement told of the

numerous applications of Soviet citizens among whom are a great number of pilots, tankmen, artillery men and officers who took part in the great war of the fatherland and are now in reserve, asking to be allowed to go to Egypt as volunteers to fight together with the Egyptian people to drive the aggressors from the Egyptian land.<sup>41</sup>

But such threats were discounted because there was no longer an excuse for Soviet action since Britain and France had already given notice of their departure. Why should the Soviet Union wait so long to announce the definite possibility of volunteers? For one thing, there was no apparent danger that would necessitate action. It was safe to rattle the sword and such warnings to the

colonialists made the Soviet Union appear on the scene as the saviour of oppressed peoples. And the Soviet Union was not hesitant in assuming responsibility for making the invaders quit Egypt. In the opinion of the Soviet Academy of Sciences:

The clear and firm position of the Soviet Union in defense of Egypt, its determination to take an active part in the restraining of the aggressors, in the restoration of peace in the Near East, in averting a new world war, proved to have a sobering influence on the ruling circles of England and France and to have played a decisive role in the cessation of hostilities.<sup>42</sup>

It would appear as though the Soviet Union may have been successful in carrying out the image of saviour. At a meeting of heads of state and kings from the Arab countries which was held in Beirut, there was a general feeling of sympathy expressed over the plight of Egypt. President Kuwatly of Syria tried to get Lebanon's President Chamoun to break diplomatic relations with Britain and France, but the attempt was opposed by the Saudi Arabians and Iraqis. A reason for their opposition might have been that too much turmoil in the Mid-East might cause the revenues derived from oil to undergo a sharp drop.<sup>43</sup>

President Kuwatly had written a letter to Bulganin in which he expressed approval of the Soviet Union's position. He said:

The Soviet Union continues to support the cause of those countries struggling for their development, independence and sovereignty. On behalf of the Syrian people and myself, I take pleasure in expressing.... our most cordial thanks....<sup>44</sup>

Of course, Egypt was most grateful to the Soviet Union. The Egyptian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mohammed A. el-Kouni, stated in a radio message:

I believe that an historic moment has now come, a new stage in the strengthening of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union and in the consolidation of the cooperation between Egypt and the Soviet Union, and in the consolidation of cooperation between our countries. Egypt has learned who her sincere friend is. Events have confirmed the noble sincerity of the Soviet Union.<sup>45</sup>

Why had Britain and France broken off the fighting and given the control of the Canal back to Egypt? The French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, listed four reasons which are, in order of importance: the division of British opinion; pressure from the United States; pressure from the United Nations; and the intervention of the Soviet Union.<sup>46</sup>

But no matter what the reasons, the Soviet Union and Egypt seemed to win what they wanted. Nasser was in control of the Suez Canal, but in gaining this prize he had lost any possibility of Western assistance for the Aswan Dam. And the Soviet Union had won a tremendous increase of its prestige and influence in the Middle East which made up for the peace drive blunder earlier in the year. The defeat of the Anglo-French Suez policy was a big set-back for the Western position in the Middle East. Though defeated on the battlefield, Nasser had achieved a political victory. He had won the respect of the Arab world and enhanced the prestige of Egypt. There were

repercussions coming from Egypt's attaining a new status. The leadership of Iraq no longer could be sure of its hold on the country, while in Syria it seemed as though forces were pushing that state farther to the left and closer to Nasser. Jordan broke its treaty with Great Britain and joined a unified military command with Egypt and Syria. Britain and France no longer could wield the same amount of influence in the Middle East as they had just before the Suez Canal crisis.<sup>47</sup>

The Soviet policy during the Suez crisis was very important for the future of Russian influence in the area. Russia had shown that it supported the Arab cause but the United States had also given its backing to Nasser. For the Soviet Union, it was not very important that Britain, France, and Israel were dealt a strong blow. Rather, the United States had to be pushed out of the area for this was the main Soviet objective. Now the Soviets had to prove to the Arabs that America was the real enemy.

A propaganda campaign was launched to vilify the United States and to support Nasser in the United Nations talks on the armistice provisions. The Soviet press tried to create the impression that the Mid-East was a tinderbox, with the United States trying to oust Britain and France from the area so it could take their place. And when the Israeli position on freedom of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba was accepted by the United States, the Soviet Union

was quick to denounce the action.<sup>48</sup>

So far, we have seen that Egypt and Syria had been the countries most inclined to be pro-Soviet in their outlook. However, beginning in 1956, Yemen, which for the past twenty years had followed the lead of Saudi Arabia in international affairs, developed its own policy and sought close relations with Egypt and the Soviet Union.

This new Yemeni policy was caused by both external and domestic factors. Yemeni-British relations became increasingly strained when the latter power pushed plans for the formation of a federation of states in the Aden Protectorate. Yemen resented this action since it had claimed the area was part of "Southern Yemen." Within Yemen the person having the most influence upon the new foreign policy was Crown Prince Mohammed Badr. He constantly was condemning Western imperialism and praising the Pan-Arab cause. The Crown Prince was doing nothing more than expressing general Arab sentiment, but even this was a new course for backward Yemen.

The Crown Prince visited the Soviet Union in June of 1956 and in August he got the Government of Yemen to recognize Communist China. The Suez crisis further strengthened Yemen's pro-Soviet attitude with the result being arms deliveries to Yemen from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.<sup>49</sup> The arms were valued about \$9 million

and to this shipment was added agreements for economic development and technical aid "with no strings attached."<sup>50</sup>

During the latter part of 1956 the Soviet aid program had become quite active. In addition to the aid given to Yemen, the Soviet Union also sold 200,000 tons of wheat to Egypt for 600,000 Egyptian pounds. With the money received, the Soviet Union would buy Egyptian goods including cotton and rice. Also, it was decided that Russia would sell Egypt 300,000 tons of fuel oil with the money again being used to purchase Egyptian goods.<sup>51</sup> Syria got into the act when she signed a cultural agreement with Russia calling for "an extensive exchange of experiences and achievements in literature, art, science, higher education, popular education, physical culture, sports and other fields."<sup>52</sup> Also, as a sign of mutual respect, the Damascus legation of the Soviet Union and the Moscow legation of Syria were raised to Embassy status. And in December, Russia offered Syria an oil refinery and the technicians necessary to get its operation underway.<sup>53</sup>

In all, 1956 was an important year for Soviet Middle Eastern policy. By the end of that year, Soviet prestige was very high and the trade-aid program was winning new friends. But if Egypt dominated the news in 1956, the following year found Syria causing the most problems.



## VI Trouble With Syria

The year 1957 began with a Mid-Eastern policy statement by the United States, which came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Soviet Union saw in this statement a propaganda boon which would help in picturing the United States as a threat to the Arabs.<sup>1</sup> The Doctrine was the United States' answer to the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of French and British forces from Suez. To bolster those still pro-Western, Middle Eastern forces and the mobilizing of Congressional opinion were the main reasons for expounding the Doctrine. In effect, the United States offered economic aid and arms to those Middle Eastern countries which would take them, and the guarantee of American assistance to any Mid-Eastern country threatened by "armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism."

The manner of the Doctrine's promulgation was unfortunate since the Arab governments concerned had not been consulted. Therefore, the United States had only made a unilateral declaration, lacking the firm consent and adherence of the Arab states.<sup>2</sup> Another drawback for the Doctrine was that any country which agreed to accept the proffered aid, particularly in view of the declaration's other provisions, would be accused of submission to the West and betraying Arab nationalism. Also, the policy did not take cognizance of the realities of the area.

For one thing, the Soviet Union was not about to launch an attack against any Mid-Eastern country. The real danger was in subversion by pro-Nasser groups but Egypt was not a Communist country and thus, not the kind of aggressor mentioned in the Doctrine. Therefore, other than for the offer of economic aid, the Doctrine was of no real value.

The above considerations as to the Doctrine's value are born out by the fact that, outside the Baghdad Pact, only one Arab state accepted without conditions - Libya. Saudi Arabia and Lebanon were lukewarm in their adherence, while Syria, Egypt, and Yemen flatly turned it down.<sup>3</sup>

From 1956 onward, there was a change in the domestic operations of the Egyptian Government. This resulted in the nationalization of foreign businesses and Egyptian property; close state control of business; intensive industrialization; and increased taxes for higher income groups. The regime moved farther away from the West and took to using Marxist and class-warfare slogans.

There were several reasons for this trend. One explanation is that Egypt was having trouble with its economic and social problems and so felt that more stringent means were necessary to relieve their causes. Also, there is Nasser's desire to be a great leader of the masses, and one way to do this is to oppose the wealthy and ruling groups.<sup>4</sup>

All of these activities made it appear to the West as though Egypt would completely fall under Soviet influence. The fear arose that Russia could order the closing of the Suez Canal, thus putting a great strain on Western Europe's economy. The Soviet view optimistically predicted Egypt's joining the Communist bloc with a consequent increase of Soviet power in the Middle East. This development would confirm the belief that the Soviet trade and aid program for the underdeveloped countries would bring them into the Soviet sphere.<sup>5</sup>

In view of its recent successes the Soviet Union felt the time right to propose to the West that a joint declaration of principles be enunciated for the Middle East. No doubt this was done in the hope that, if the West accepted, Russia would be acknowledged as having a vital interest in the area. According to the Soviet Union, the principles would be:

1. The preservation of peace in the Near and Middle East by setting questions at issue exclusively by peaceful means, on the basis of the method of negotiations.
2. Noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East. Respect for the sovereignty and independence of these countries.
3. Refusal to undertake any attempts to draw these countries into military alignments with the participation of the great powers.
4. The liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of countries of the Near and Middle East.
5. Joint refusal to supply arms to countries of the Near and Middle East.

6. Assistance in the economic development of countries of the Near and Middle East without putting forward any political, military, or other conditions, incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.<sup>6</sup>

One can see at a glance that, if accepted, the Baghdad Pact and any other conceivable type Western defensive system in the area would be impossible. The Middle East would be a subversive's heaven, and so the plan was rejected by the West.

But the above were minor events of 1957 when compared to the uproar which arose over Syria. There were two crises which occurred over that Arab state which made war appear imminent in the Middle East.

The first crisis had its beginnings in 1956 just about the time of the invasion of Egypt. Syrian President Kuwatly, visiting in the Soviet Union, signed a communique expressing Soviet-Syrian friendship. But more important than such declarations, was the fact that during November and December of 1956, Soviet arms were reaching Syria in ever greater quantity. Since Syria censored any news about the arms shipments, the interest of the West was sharpened. There were even rumors, which Russia denied, of a Soviet military base.

What happened in Syria was that the army high command, in league with several cabinet members, had taken control. Several Western observers believed that Soviet influence and arms shipments were greater than, in fact, they really were. These notions of Soviet control were not eliminated

by such statements by President Kuwatly as "the Soviet Union will march with us" and "our army will stand by the side of the Soviet army in defense against aggression, whenever the two armies are required to defend peace and freedom in the world."<sup>7</sup>

But though Syria was not a satellite of the Soviets as some thought, it was assuming an important position in Soviet policy. There was a large quantity of Soviet arms deposited in the country, and many influential groups were pro-Soviet. The illegal Communist Party, whose leader, Khaled Bakdash, was a member of Parliament, worked unimpaired in the open. The younger officers were pro-Soviet because of a belief that Russia was the only power to prove its support for the Arabs.<sup>8</sup> This attitude of many Syrians was, in part, the result of suspicion and hostility toward the West. There was dissatisfaction with Syria's accomplishments, her politicians, and her frequent military dictatorships. Also, there was the fact that Syrians are less worldly-wise than some of their neighbors.<sup>9</sup>

This feeling reached a high point in January 1957, when a mass trial of pro-Western and conservative leaders occurred on a charge of attempted overthrow of the Government with intent to introduce pro-Western leadership.<sup>10</sup> Further alarms were raised by Iraqi machinations to get northern Syrian landowners to stage a coup d'etat in Iraq's favor. Then there were bribes being offered by

Saudi Arabia for its own purposes. All of these things had Syria at a fever pitch.

There was political scheming by such men as Khalid al-Azm, who sought Soviet help in eliminating the Ba'thists. There were three main political groups seeking power in Syria: the Communists; the Ba'th; and the nationalist parties. All were seeking some sort of union with Egypt, but by various means and for different purposes. The nationalists and the Communists wanted a loose federation in which Syria could maintain autonomy with Soviet support. The Ba'th wanted outright fusion between Syria and Egypt.<sup>11</sup> This particular debate lasted all through 1957.

The internal tension within Syria died down while Soviet influence continued to increase. In March, Syria accepted a Czechoslovak offer to build an oil refinery but turned down a loan from the World Bank because of excessive interest and fear of political pressure. Of course, Syria was not afraid of such pressure when she asked the Soviet Union for the loan instead.

The objective of the Soviet Union was to have Syria as an ally, and not a satellite. This goal met with no objections on the part of the Syrian Government, and people, for they felt that there were common international aims between Syria and Russia. Also, Syria admired Soviet social and economic accomplishments. But it was not enough that Syria follow a favorable foreign policy, the



Soviet Union also wanted an internal revolution which would form a unity of ideology between Syria and Russia.

However, what Syria did not realize was that by proclaiming its close friendship with the Soviet Union, the other Arab states might be frightened away by thoughts of Soviet hegemony. Soviet policy called for a gradual increase of influence throughout the entire Arab bloc and not the creation of spectacular gains which could alienate support in other quarters. But the Syrians did not do as they were supposed to, and felt that they could challenge their neighbors and receive Soviet support for their actions.<sup>12</sup>

Syria, by the summer of 1957, was the closest to the Soviet Union of all the Arab states, and the strongest single political group in the country was the Communist Party.<sup>13</sup> The strength of the Communist Party had grown as the result of maneuvers such as this: Khaled Bakdash made a speech which caused the resignation in protest of thirty-six People's Party parliamentary deputies in June, 1957. What incidents such as these show is that the opposition was giving up its influence, rather than having it snatched away by the Communists.<sup>14</sup>

The main crisis over Syria began in July 1957, with a trip by Khaled al Azm to Europe. Many believed that he was sent away in disgrace as a measure of appeasement to King Saud, whom al Azm had attacked in a speech. However, Khaled al Azm wound up in Moscow, with a delegation,

to talk to the Soviet leadership.<sup>15</sup> The Syrians were in Russia from July 27 to August 7 and returned home by way of Czechoslovakia on August 16. The Syrian-Soviet communique stated that there was agreement on Soviet aid in road and railway construction, hydro-electric plans, and an increase in trade. Also discussed was the enlargement of the Syrian port of Latakia. There was no mention of the details in the military agreement but the Syrian Ambassador to the Soviet Union said: "I am now in a position to state that Syria's military requirements will be fulfilled." Fakher Kayyali, a member of the Syrian delegation, remarked that half of the Syrian budget went toward arms purchases. Finally, Khaled al-Azm said:

The U.S.S.R. has given us political support and supplied us with arms. Its stand during the Suez aggression was honorable, and you will remember .... how we received reports of Soviet intervention, and how this intervention delivered the Arabs from the major catastrophe which imperialism wanted to inflict upon them. The U.S.S.R., we believe, will continue along this line.<sup>16</sup>

On August 9, the chief of the Syrian army, Tawfiq Nizam ad-Din, a moderate, was forced to resign, and was replaced by Colonel Afif al Bizri, a Communist sympathizer. And several days later, the Syrians demanded the recall of four American diplomats who were accused of plotting the overthrow of the Government. The response of the United States was the declaration that the Syrian Ambassador was persona non grata.

The reaction of the Soviet Union to this new develop-

ment was at first subdued. Soviet press editorials assumed the attitude that American conspiracies were not unusual and could be expected.<sup>17</sup>

More purges followed in Syria when many army and police officials were arrested and Foreign Ministry members were transferred. It now appeared as though the Syrian leadership, although nominally committed to union with Egypt, was letting itself fall under Soviet direction.<sup>18</sup>

The United States sent Deputy Under-Secretary Loy Henderson on a tour of Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey to assess the Mid-Eastern situation. Upon his return, Henderson reported that these countries were concerned by Syrian developments and afraid she might become a Soviet satellite.<sup>19</sup> The United States sent arms to Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq to strengthen these governments against possible subversion. Syria was warned by the United States that if she gave herself over to Soviet domination she could fall under the sanctions of the Eisenhower Doctrine.<sup>20</sup>

The Soviet press reacted to these American steps with such statements as "Dangerous Moves," and "America is using blackmail and pressure - this is the Eisenhower Doctrine in action, America has learned nothing from Britain's experience." "The U.S. prepares aggression; the American aggressive conspiracy should be suppressed at once."<sup>21</sup> On September 10, Soviet Foreign Minister

Gromyko accused the United States, Britain, and Turkey of a "provocative campaign" against Syria. And the Soviet press warned of Turkish troops being concentrated along the Syrian border. Marshal Bulganin, on September 13, wrote a letter to Turkey's Prime Minister warning him not to attack Syria and threatening Soviet action. A Soviet Naval Squadron arrived off Latakia on September 19 and was given a hearty welcome. The next day all Syrian Army leaves were cancelled; roads between Latakia, Homs, and Aleppo were closed, and an emergency meeting of the Defense Committee was called.<sup>22</sup> The situation seemed all the more explosive when the United States' Sixth Fleet was reported to be off the Syrian coast and when TASS reported a "hysterical hullabaloo" in the United States.<sup>23</sup> The Soviet Union promised Syria total diplomatic and military protection in case of attack.

On September 19 Secretary Dulles told the United Nations General Assembly that in Syria "political power is being increasingly taken over by those who depend on Moscow." The reaction of the United States was to send more arms to friendly countries in the Mid-East.<sup>24</sup>

Khrushchev, on October 7, said that the United States was inciting Turkey to war with Syria but then warned that if war did occur, the Soviet Union would not stand idly by.<sup>25</sup> No doubt the Soviet Union had some cause to be worried about Syria. There were the Turkish military maneuvers along the Syrian border, the NATO exercises in

the Mediterranean, the Henderson mission, the American warning about the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the increased American arms shipments to the Mid-East. Such American displays of force had an effect upon the internal affairs of Jordan in April 1957 and they might be effective in Syria.<sup>26</sup>

The Syrian Government, on October 8, brought accusations against Turkey before the United Nations General Assembly, and formally protested to the Turkish Government the Military moves on their frontier.

On October 11, Khrushchev, bypassing the Western Governments, addressed letters to the British Labor Party and to the Socialist parties of Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland, Italy and Norway, asking them to use their influence to halt aggression in the Mid-East, and suggesting party talks with the CPSU.<sup>27</sup>

The Soviet newspaper Sovetskaya Rossia said on October 12:

Military planes from Turkey have repeatedly violated Syrian territory. Turkish soldiers are attacking the peaceful inhabitants who live along the border strip .... Bullets have already begun to fly ....

Turkey should mobilize her good sense. The unleashing of aggression against Syria, .... would mean national suicide for Turkey. The Turkish people .... should forestall those representatives of the ruling circles of their own country who, at the instigation of American militarists, are acting senselessly and irresponsibly.

The next day an Egyptian batallion landed at Latakia, an action made simple by the fact that both Egypt's and Syria's forces were under one command. And on October 15,

the Egyptians reported the declaration of a state of emergency in Syria. This action would seem to signify that matters had calmed down in Syria since the uproar in September.<sup>28</sup>

On October 15 the Soviet press accused the United States of trying to overthrow the Syrian Government. Pravda said that a group of the "antipopular National Social Party working closely with American agents in the Near East, were sent into Syria. This group was instructed to organize a government coup d'etat in Syria."<sup>29</sup> The next day Andrei Gromyko addressed a letter to the United Nations saying that the Soviets would help "crush aggression with its military forces." He also stated that Syria would be subject to an attack which "is to take place after the Turkish elections on October 27." He produced a copy of a document said to prove that Turkey would attack on October 28 but the United States rejected it as a forgery, as did the Arab delegates to whom it had been shown. But Moscow did not withdraw its statements.<sup>30</sup>

The Soviet press set out to crush the rumors that Syria was a Russian military base. The Soviet Union had to eliminate any suggestion which might give the West a justification for charges of Soviet control of Syria. Concerning reports that a naval base was being constructed in Latakia TASS said it was

authorized to state that this report does not correspond to the facts, and is from beginning to end a



fabrication calculated to justify the hostile activity of certain aggressive circles toward Syria and Yemen.<sup>31</sup>

TASS, on October 19, commented upon the Loy Henderson mission but failed to be entirely accurate in its reporting. The news agency stated that Henderson contacted "refugees from Syria who had participated in the recently discovered conspiracy." TASS insisted that Henderson had discussed plans for an internal upheaval in Syria aimed at supplanting the pro-Soviet leadership, and finished with a warning that the Soviet Union "will take all the necessary steps to come to the aid of the victims of an aggression."<sup>32</sup>

A few days later Russia announced that Marshal Rokossovski had been appointed to command the Trans-Caucasus Military District on the Turkish-Persian frontier, a hint that the Soviet Union would halt aggression. On October 24, there were military and naval maneuvers by the Trans-Caucasus army and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The same day Marshal Zhukov stated:

The Soviet Government has made authoritative and appropriate pronouncements that if war is declared, the Soviet Union will not remain with its arms folded. We are all ready to strike at any military adventure organized by the U.S. near our southern borders. We resolutely informed the Turkish Government of this also.

About the same time, Egypt announced that Commander-in-Chief General Amer would visit Moscow.<sup>33</sup>

But suddenly, all the talk of imminent aggression came to an end, and it was rumored that Marshal Zhukov

had been dismissed because of his errors in the Syrian crisis. On October 29, at a Turkish Embassy reception in Moscow, Khrushchev appeared in a good mood. Asked if his presence was a gesture of peace, Khrushchev said, "Yes, this is a gesture toward peace."<sup>34</sup>

This new attitude on the part of the Soviet Union was probably caused by the fact that Russia was not succeeding in scaring the Arabs into joining the Soviet camp. The arabs were not happy with Syria's refusal to accept King Saud's mediation offer. And many in the Afro-Asian bloc were angry with the Soviet Union's constant talk of war. Also, the United States and Britain reaffirmed their commitment to Turkey, and Khrushchev's proposals to the Western Socialist parties were rejected. With such set-backs Khrushchev probably thought it best to ease the crisis. By November 1, the General Assembly debate was finished without a vote taken on the Syrian complaint. The Crisis was over.<sup>35</sup>

Why did the crisis arise? Khrushchev, in an interview with Aneurin Bevan, explained:

There are gentlemen from Syria in Istanbul under the protection of the Turkish Government who are to maneuver themselves into office in Syria. Once they are in office, something will happen and if it does not happen it will be made to happen .... It will be pretended that Syrian independence is in danger and that then this Syrian Government will invite the Turks to enter.<sup>36</sup>

Thus was the official Soviet version. But it must be remembered that the United States and Turkey were concerned with Syria's radical pro-Soviet trend and at the

same time as they expressed their worry, there were NATO maneuvers in the Mediterranean and Turkish military exercise. Plus, the United States increased its arms shipments to the Mid-East. Given the suspicious mind of the Soviet Union, she could have believed that the West would attack Syria. However, it does not seem to be that simple. There are several possible reasons for the Soviet action during the Syrian crisis. One is that the Soviet Union was caught by surprise in a turmoil created by Syria and did not quite know how to respond, but thought firm action would keep Syria faithful. But one must doubt that Russia is so inexperienced that she would get caught off-guard and act so drastically over a relatively minor explosion. Another explanation is that the Soviet Union created the crisis as a means of ousting Marshal Zhukov, but to raise such a storm to excuse Zhukov's demotion could have lead to drastic international complications. This writer is inclined to feel that the Soviet Union took advantage of a tense situation created by Syria. If the Soviet Union could make it appear as though the West was about to attack Syria, then she might feel compelled to align herself with the great power for self-defense and wind up as a satellite. The other Arab states might likewise feel threatened and strengthen their ties with the Soviet Union. The end result would be a Syria turned satellite from which the other Arab states could be subverted. And since the other Mid-Eastern states

would feel threatened by the West, they would oust all pro-Western influences and turn East. But the plan did not work because instead of praising the Soviet Union as protector, the Arab bloc criticized the Soviet Union for its warlike talk, and also was angered by the fact that Syria did not accept Arabian mediation. Furthermore, the Arabs were frightened by the prospect of a Soviet oriented Syria and may have increased their Western ties instead of becoming pro-Soviet. For these reasons, Khrushchev thought it best to ease the crisis before he lost the friendship of the Arabs, and so he appeared at the Turkish embassy and made his peace statement.

Having failed to stampede the Arab bloc into the Soviet camp, Russia continued with the trade and aid program which had produced favorable results. At the end of October Syria and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on economic and technical collaboration. The agreement, based on "equality, noninterference in internal affairs and respect for the sovereignty and national dignity of both countries," called for collaboration "In the construction of railroad lines, dams, power stations, and water systems for fields and pastures", and "in the construction and renovation of highway bridges, in building a plant for nitrogen fertilizer, and in other projects, and also in the preparation of a geological map of Syria and in conducting geological prospecting ...." The Soviet

Union also agreed to do all of the designing, prospecting and research necessary for the above projects, and to supply any machinery or tools for the work which Syria lacked. Credit was to be for a twelve year period at 2.5% interest.<sup>37</sup>

In November, an Egyptian delegation under General Abdul Hakim Amer, the Minister of Defense, visited the Soviet Union at the latter's invitation.

During the conversations the Soviet Government in response to the desires of the Egyptian government and President Gamal Abdel Nasser, expressed readiness to offer Egypt economic and technical aid in developing its national economy. The Soviet Union's contribution to this matter [was] sincere, friendly, and based on respect for the national dignity and sovereignty of Egypt.<sup>38</sup>

The next month another Egyptian delegation, this time of cultural leaders, signed an agreement calling for a festival of Soviet films to be shown in Egypt, with the favor to be returned by the Soviet Union. Russia further agreed to send ballet teachers to help organize dance studios in Egypt. Also, it was provided that there would be an exchange of books and periodicals dealing with the history and culture of the two countries.<sup>39</sup> That same month the Soviet Union, "following with profound sympathy the efforts of the Egyptian and Syrian peoples to develop their national economies, expressed its readiness to render them economic and technical assistance in carrying out their construction plans..."<sup>40</sup>

During the winter of 1957-1958, Crown Prince Badr of

Yemen visited the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania, and Communist China. In Peking he signed a ten-year trade and aid agreement and soon Chinese and Soviet technicians were building a road between Sana and Hodeida. However, Yemen continued to cherish its relations with the West and allowed the United States to establish a permanent legation in Taizz.<sup>41</sup>

Nineteen fifty-eight began with an Afro-Asian conference in Cairo, but most of the representatives which attended were not governmental officials. Nevertheless, for Nasser it did represent a boost of his prestige among the underdeveloped countries.<sup>42</sup> Most of the governments invited, save for the Communist ones, declined and so the conference was one of those leftist and pro-Soviet affairs out of which the Russians usually gather propaganda capital. The attempt was made to have the conference considered as a second Bandung - thus the title, People's Bandung. The Soviet delegate, who should not have been there if it was a second Bandung, said, "We are ready to help you as brother helps brother. Tell us what you need and we will help you and send, to the best of our abilities, money in the form of loans or aid." The neutrals at the conference were silenced and the Soviets and Chinese were dominant.

President Nasser, who did not attend the conference, allowed a permanent headquarters to be established in Cairo. On its secretariat there were one Soviet and one



Chinese, and this group became active in Africa. This was the biggest gain for the Soviet Union to come out of the Conference. But in spite of these gains, the Soviet Union was not satisfied with Egypt's response to Soviet blandishments; she was moving away.<sup>43</sup>

This new coolness in the Egyptian attitude was soon followed by another set-back for Soviet policy - the formation of the United Arab Republic. This was an unexpected occurrence and was primarily caused by Syrian initiative. When Khaled el Azm was in Russia he spoke of the "federal union with Egypt which we are going to establish soon." However, the process was hastened by leaders of the Ba'ath, who wanted a very close Egyptian connection, and they persuaded a lukewarm Nasser that union would be a favorable course of action.<sup>44</sup> In the negotiations, the Ba'athists had the support of government, army, and business groups who feared the pro-Soviet trend in Syria.<sup>45</sup>

The next Arab state to seek closer ties with Egypt was Yemen, which federated with the United Arab Republic on March 8, 1958. The title, United Arab States, was the designation of the U.A.R. and Yemen, the latter keeping its government and identity separate.<sup>46</sup>

Within Syria the repercussions of the union were most displeasing to the Soviet Union. The various political parties, including the Communist, were subject to the restrictions as obtained in Egypt. The Communist party

was illegal and its members received the Nasser-type treatment. Khaled al-Azam was in disgrace and went into exile.<sup>47</sup>

The Soviet Union did not like the U.A.R.; Russia had always advocated Arab nationalism but not an Arab nation. But the Soviets could not criticize the new entity since this would cause a loss of grace in Arab eyes.<sup>48</sup> What could the Soviet Union do? To support Nasser in this action would be to hand over to his tender mercies some of the most ardent Soviet supporters in the Middle East. To attack Nasser would be an admission by Khrushchev that he had blundered in his policies. Thus, the reaction of Russia was friendly, and she was one of the first to recognize the U.A.R.<sup>49</sup>

## VII An Evaluation

The trade and aid program of the Soviet Union of necessity must be accompanied by political measures if policy objectives are to be reached. In looking at the Middle East, we see that Egypt, Syria, and Yemen were the recipients of much aid and political support. The aid program is impressive considering that fact that it was only begun in 1953. What makes it more astounding is the fact that the Soviet Gross National Product does not make it too attractive for the Soviet Union to divert its resources into aid channels.<sup>1</sup>

In organizing their aid program, the Soviets "render economic and technical assistance first of all to the state sector of their economies." This is done in the belief that "only by relying on a strong state sector can the young countries safeguard their economic independence in the struggle against the powerful monopolistic associations of the imperialists." The Soviets always try to make maximum use of the aid recipient's own natural resources, and this policy in turn "contributes to the development of initiative in the young states and maximum savings of scarce foreign currency and expansion of domestic output of all branches of the economy..." Another purpose of this policy, the importance of which we shall discuss later, is the "creation of scientific and technical cadres" in the underdeveloped countries.<sup>2</sup>

It would be a mistake to consider the Soviet aid program as consisting of free grants; rather, it is capitalist in nature, with the granting of long-term loans at interest. The aid program is really one of international lending.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet Union's loans were more desirable than those of the West because the interest rates on the former were 2.5% - 3%, as opposed to 4% - 6% for the latter.<sup>4</sup> However, the trade agreements do not appear to have such a business-like character. Here the Soviet Union accepts payment in commodities the buyer usually exports, and in repayment of loans, this too is the case. From Egypt the Soviets usually accept cotton and rice; from Syria, cotton, oil seeds, vegetable oil, fruits, vegetables, wool, tobacco, skins, hides, hemp, and textiles. This would seem to indicate that the Soviet Union many times accepts goods it does not need, thus it is really aiding the countries.<sup>5</sup>

The Soviet Union is fond of speaking as though only the Socialist states offer "true" aid.

Trade of the underdeveloped countries with the Western powers is based on the principles of ruthless exploitation and plunder, whereas their relations with the Soviet Union are founded on the principles of business-like cooperation, equality of the sides, and mutual advantage. In this sense, trade with the Soviet Union and the other Socialist states can be regarded as assistance in winning economic independence by the underdeveloped countries.<sup>6</sup>

But there are strings attached to the aid, even though the Arab leaders would not consider them as such. The economies, development, finances, and armaments are

dependent upon Soviet aid and equipment. Thus, to operate what they have received from the Soviet Union, the Arabs need Russian advisers, technicians, training, and replacement parts. This gives the Soviet Union a measure of control over the recipient states.<sup>7</sup>

Also, the Soviet technicians are the teachers of the Middle Eastern experts, thus orienting this important group toward Soviet technical experience. And when more trained personnel are needed, they are sent to Soviet schools for training, an important means of spreading Russian propaganda.<sup>8</sup>

In terms of psychological impact, the Soviet aid may be bringing profitable returns. The Soviet emphasis upon heavy industry results in projects which are on exhibit for all to see and appreciate. Also, Soviet aid was not invested in local enterprises, and so escaped some criticism like that directed against Western private firms which were accused of trying to win control of Asian industries. The Soviet Union has given the appearance of not wishing to interfere in the economic life of the underdeveloped countries.<sup>9</sup>

There are various reasons for the Soviet Union's economic offensive. For one, the Soviets would like to see the traditional trade between the underdeveloped countries and the West disrupted. This objective is helped by the difficulty now experienced by the underdeveloped countries in having the value of their raw materials

decline while the Western countries are charging more for the products of their industry. But this factor has still not lessened the advantages of trade with the Western nations, although this situation could still change. The Soviet Union would like to keep the West from the raw materials upon which it depends, and to keep it from selling its finished products to the East.<sup>10</sup>

Another objective of Soviet aid is to lessen Western influence in the world, and to obtain world domination by demonstrating the superiority of the Soviet way of life over all others. Since many underdeveloped countries are more interested in economic development than in ideology, economic aid would bring more rewards.<sup>11</sup>

The Soviet Union has realized the necessity of carrying on the East-West struggle on economic terms. For example, it has been observed:

The changes in the balance of forces in the world and the change in the very nature of war, add tremendously to the significance of peaceful co-existence among countries with different socio-economic systems. The intensive growth and increased might of the Socialist system offers a real possibility for the triumph of the principles of peaceful co-existence throughout the historical period in which the two socio-economic systems - Capitalism and Socialism - will exist side by side. The threat of a nuclear holocaust has made it a vital necessity for all mankind.<sup>12</sup>

The same writer believed that such conditions as he described allowed the Soviet Union to prove the superiority of its system.

We have seen that there is speculation among Communists



as to the role played by the so-called national bourgeoisie. The Communists ostensibly believe that the national bourgeoisie will begin to remove the influence of foreign capital — economic imperialism — and supplant it with their own.

... the absolute increase in the amount of foreign capital is accompanied by its relative weakening, and a decline of its share in the economy. The prospect undoubtedly is one of worsened relations between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism and, on this basis, broad sections of the bourgeoisie could be drawn into the struggle against imperialism.<sup>13</sup>

In spite of this potential role of the national bourgeoisie as a progressive force, this group was still backward in important areas, and a class conflict would develop between these and the workers.

A national democracy is not a socialist state. Its purpose is to complete the general democratic, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution. The consistent accomplishment of these tasks will greatly accelerate the progress of the revolution, lead the masses into the political arena, expelling the pro-imperialist, reactionary elements. A re-grouping of class forces is likewise inevitable: the working class, peasantry and democratic intellectuals will become the ruling and leading force in the coalition holding power in a national democracy.<sup>14</sup>

Thus will end the national bourgeoisie; in a most classical Communist manner. There does not seem to be any contradiction between this approach and that of traditional Communism. As a good Communist one could argue that historical periods cannot be skipped and that the bourgeoisie does have a progressive role. But in view of the fact that the Soviet Union does not vehemently denounce anti-Communist activity in some of the underdeveloped countries

one could ask whether the Russians—ideologically speaking—do not give too great an emphasis to the national bourgeoisie.

In applying these considerations to the Middle East, we can detect several problems. How can the Soviets meet the desires and needs of the area while establishing close relationship and not creating a third world force? What is the maximum limit the aid program can approach before the Soviet bloc is subject to a strain on its growth potential? So far Russia has solved the second question by a careful allotment of tasks to the satellites in such a way as not to inhibit and still take advantage of the economic potential of each bloc country.<sup>15</sup>

Up until about 1953, the Soviet Union directed only between 5 - 10% of its trade to the Mid-East, and much of this went to Iran and Turkey, her traditional partners, and not to the Arab states.<sup>16</sup> From 1954 the Soviet Union made large increases in its trade with Egypt and Syria. In 1954 Egypt imported 5.9% of her total imports from the Soviet bloc, and in 1956 and 1957 the import figures were 13% and 26% respectively. As for exports to the Soviet bloc from Egypt, the figures for the above mentioned years were 14.1%, 34%, and 47% respectively. Syria's trade figures were not as large as Egypt's, but some idea of Soviet success is seen in the fact that in the single year between 1956 and 1957, Syrian imports from the Soviet bloc increased three times, and her ex-

ports, two times.<sup>17</sup>

It is estimated that from 1956 to 1958, the Arabs received more than a billion dollars in credit from the Soviet bloc. Egypt received about \$300 - \$320 million in credit for development, and about \$250 million for arms; Syria got) \$200 - \$300 million credit for development and \$150 - \$250 million credit for arms; Yemen, \$75 million development and \$20 million credit for arms.<sup>18</sup>

To pay for all of this the Egyptians and Syrians mortgaged their cotton crops for many years. In 1955 - 1956 the Soviet bloc received 36,800 tons of Syrian cotton, two-thirds of which went to Czechoslovakia. By 1958 Syria was sending 40% of her exports to the bloc, most of which in that year went to China. In 1955 the satellites took about 12.5% of Egypt's cotton exports, and the next year the figure was 27.5%, which involved more cotton because of the higher percentage of export and increased cotton production. It is estimated that in 1955 - 1956 the bloc took about \$100 million worth which it did not need as a political measure. The next year the bloc could not purchase so much cotton because its warehouses were overloaded, but they did take 54.5% of Egypt's exports. However, the high percentage represented less cotton because Egypt's farmers had had a bad year. And during the first eight months of 1958, the Soviet bloc purchased 62.6% of Egyptian exports.

These figures would seem to indicate that the Soviet

bloc has been a great boon to the Arab economy. It was, but there were also drawbacks. For example, the Soviet Union paid high prices for the cotton, but this caused Egypt's Western customers to buy elsewhere at cheaper prices. Egypt realized what happened and blamed the Soviet Union for the loss.<sup>20</sup>

Another grievance of the Arabs was that the Soviet goods they purchased were of low quality, and their delivery was too slow. Several times negotiations between Egypt and Russia were delayed by Egypt's insistence upon guaranteed prices, quality and delivery.<sup>21</sup>

Why do the Arabs trade with the Soviet Union in view of her political aims and the dissatisfaction of the Arabs with Soviet goods? For one thing, there are advantages in this trade, such as the Soviet policy of accepting the raw materials and goods of the Arab states as payment. Then there is the fact that the Arabs still dislike the old colonialists, and Soviet propaganda has not let this feeling slowly evaporate. Also, the Arabs feel as though there are no political strings tied to trade with the Soviet Union, and they do not believe that they will be drawn into the Soviet orbit. The attitude seems to be one of doing business with the devil so long as you do not lose your soul.<sup>21</sup> The Soviet Union, however, has been distressed by the fact that at times the Egyptian press has not given adequate coverage to the loan negotiations, and the people of Egypt have been apathetic

toward the Soviet's generosity. Since the present leadership of the Arab countries is anti-Communist, the only real hope for a strong pro-Soviet trend lies in those technicians trained by the Soviet Union. Perhaps the younger generation will be more amenable to Marxist ideas, but this is only a slim hope.<sup>22</sup> The more successful the Soviet aid program is at raising the Arab standard of living, the less the attraction of Communism. There is little the Soviet technicians can do to proselytize in Egypt because the government there tries to isolate the Soviets from the population. This segregation is the result of Nasser's fear that Soviet propaganda might have an effect on Egypt's poverty stricken rural areas and produce an anti-government attitude. Also, the Arabs feel that the Soviets could not offer an acceptable solution for their rural problems, so the best thing to do is keep them from causing harm.<sup>23</sup>

Keeping in mind the dependence of the Arabs on the Soviet Union which we have discussed, and their attitude toward Soviet technicians, can the Soviet Union force political concessions not wanted by the Arabs? Not in the present situation, because their economies are not that dependent and most likely, the Arabs will be careful not to become too indebted to the Russians. But even if the Arabs did go in over their heads, it is doubtful whether they would bow to the dictates of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union need fail only once in a policy

of dictation to ruin its prestige in the Mid-East.<sup>24</sup>  
The Arabs could turn to the West and be forever lost to the Soviet Union.

Thus, the Soviet policy of trade and aid continues. It does not seem as though the Soviet Union can make great gains for itself in the Middle East, but it has been able to keep Western influence to a minimum. Perhaps this is all the Soviets can hope for, but they will undoubtedly try for more. However, on the whole, Soviet policy has been very successful and more so than the Russians should have hoped.



Chapter I

1. Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World, p. 73.
2. Halford L. Hoskins, The Middle East, p. 275.
3. J.S. Ralieggh, "Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years," Middle Eastern Affairs, X (January, 1959) pp. 15-16.
4. John M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 119.
5. Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 150-151.
6. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 118.
7. Partner, op. cit., p. 72.
8. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, pp. 290-291.
9. John H. Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India, pp. 183-192.
10. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
11. Dallin, op. cit., p. 390.
12. Halford L. Hoskins, "Soviet Economic Penetration in the Middle East," Orbis, III (Winter 1960) p. 459.
13. Dallin, op. cit., p. 386.
14. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 120.
15. Raleigh, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
16. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 118.
17. Dallin, op. cit., p. 390.
18. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 194-195.
19. Charles Issawi, Egypt in Revolution, p. 46.
20. George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, p. 276.
21. Issawi, op. cit., pp. 49-52.
22. Kirk, op. cit., p. 279.
23. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 120.

Chapter II

1. John M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 119.
2. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 389.
3. Halford L. Hoskins, "Soviet Economic Penetration in the Middle East," Orbis, III (Winter 1960) pp. 458-460.
4. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 385-287.
5. Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 152.
6. Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World, p. 74.
7. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 152-153.
8. Ibid., pp. 197-198.
9. Ibid., p. 153.
10. Ibid., p. 198.
11. Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive, pp. 210-211.
12. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 195.
13. Dallin, op. cit., p. 389.
14. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 121.
15. George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, p. 279.
16. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 196.
17. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 121.
18. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 196.
19. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 119.
20. J. S. Raleigh, "Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years," Middle Eastern Affairs, X (January, 1959) p. 6.
21. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 196-197.
22. Ibid., pp. 151-152.

23. Ibid., p. 197.
24. Dallin, op. cit., p. 391.
25. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
26. Ibid., p. 153.

Chapter III

1. Halford L. Hoskins, "Soviet Economic Penetration in the Middle East," Orbis, III (Winter 1960) pp. 458-459.
2. Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 156-157.
3. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, pp. 388-389.
4. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 216.
5. Pravda, January 9, 1955 p. 3.
6. Ibid., p. 4.
7. Izvestia, March 2, 1955 p. 4.
8. Trud, March 30, 1955 p. 4.
9. Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World, p. 75.
10. John M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 122.
11. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 216.
12. Dallin, op. cit., p. 388.
13. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 127.
14. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 665.
15. Pravda, April 24, 1955 p. 3.
16. Mackintosh, op. cit., pp. 124-125.
17. Ibid., p. 122.
18. Ibid., p. 126.
19. Dallin, op. cit., p. 464.
20. Ibid., pp. 392-393.
21. John S. Badeau, "The Soviet Approach to the Arab World," Orbis, III(Spring 1959) p. 80.
22. Jan Wszelaki, Communist Economic Strategy, p. 98.
23. Wlodzimierz Backowski, Soviet Policy in the Middle East, pp. 16-17.

24. Badeau, op. cit., p. 73.
25. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 391-394.
26. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 219-220.
27. Izvestia, August 21, 1955 p. 4.
28. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 220.
29. Dallin, op. cit., p. 394.
30. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 211.
31. Ibid., p. 224.
32. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 125.
33. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 212.
34. Ibid., p. 222.
35. Pravda, October 2, 1955
36. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 223-224.
37. Mackintosh, op. cit., pp. 123-124.
38. Dallin, op. cit., p. 396.
39. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 125.
40. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 213-215.
41. Wszelaki, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
42. Hoskins, op. cit., p. 463.
43. Partner, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
44. Dallin, op. cit., p. 396.
45. Ibid., pp. 398-400.
46. Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive, p. 211.
47. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 219.
48. Dallin, op. cit., p. 397.
49. George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, p. 282.
50. Partner, op. cit., p. 77.
51. Kirk, op. cit., p. 282.

Chapter IV

1. Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive, p. 191.
2. Hugh Seton-Watson, "The Communist Powers and Afro-Asian Nationalism," Unity and Contradiction, Kurt London (ed.), pp. 194-196.
3. Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 162.
4. Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 192-194.
5. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 163-167.
6. Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 203-203.



Chapter V

1. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 402.
2. J.S. Raleigh, "Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years" Middle Eastern Affairs, X (January, 1959) pp. 8-9.
3. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 400-401.
4. Pravda, February 14, 1956.
5. Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 229.
6. Dallin, op. cit., p. 401.
7. International Affairs, Moscow, Number 5, May 1956.
8. John M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 126.
9. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 230.
10. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 402-403.
11. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 230-231.
12. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 403-404.
13. Pravda, July 3, 1956 p. 4.
14. Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive, p. 212.
15. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 404-405.
16. Pravda, July 28, 1956.
17. Dallin, op. cit., p. 405.
18. Ibid., pp. 407-408.
19. The Record on Suez, p. 4.
20. Pravda, August 1, 1956 p. 16.
21. The Record on Suez, p. 4.
22. Pravda, August 10, 1956.
23. The Record on Suez, p. 6.
24. The Suez Canal Conference, p. 5.

25. Ibid., p. 7.
26. Pravda, August 26, 1956.
27. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 237.
28. Dallin, op. cit., p. 410.
29. The Record on Suez, p. 9.
30. Ibid., p. 9.
31. Ibid., p. 9.
32. Trud, September 29, 1956.
33. The Record on Suez, p. 11.
34. Ibid., p. 11.
35. The New York Times, November 1, 1956.
36. Dallin, op. cit., p. 415.
37. Pravda, November 2, 1956.
38. Pravda, November 5, 1956.
39. Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League.
40. Dallin, op. cit., p. 418.
41. Pravda, November 11, 1956.
42. Dallin, op. cit., p. 418.
43. The Record on Suez, p. 16.
44. Pravda, November 9, 1956.
45. Pravda, November 15, 1956.
46. Dallin, op. cit., p. 418.
47. Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World, pp. 79-80.
48. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 241-242.
49. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 584-585.
50. Halford L. Hoskins, "Soviet Economic Penetration in the Middle East," Orbis, III (Winter 1960) pp. 465-466.

51. Pravda, September 6, 1956 p. 3.
52. Pravda, August 22, 1956 p. 6.
53. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 126.

Chapter VI

1. Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 242-243.
2. Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World, pp. 80-81.
3. J.S. Raleigh, "Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years," Middle Eastern Affairs, X (January, 1959) pp. 10-11.
4. Charles Issawi, Egypt in Revolution, pp. 54-55.
5. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, pp. 466-467.
6. The New York Times, February 13, 1957.
7. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 252-253.
8. Dallin, op. cit., p. 468.
9. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 248.
10. Ibid., p. 253.
11. Partner, op. cit., p. 82.
12. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 253-255.
13. Ibid., p. 247.
14. Ibid., p. 253.
15. Ibid., p. 256.
16. John M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 224.
17. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 256-257.
18. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 226.
19. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 468-469.
20. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 226.
21. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 257.
22. Mackintosh, op. cit., pp. 226-227.
23. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 258.
24. Dallin, op. cit., p. 469.

25. Mackintosh, op. cit., pp. 227-228.
26. Ibid., pp. 230-231.
27. Ibid., p. 228.
28. Ibid., p. 228.
29. Pravda, October 15, 1957, p. 3.
30. Dallin, op. cit., p. 471.
31. Pravda, October 17, 1957, p. 2.
32. Dallin, op. cit., p. 471.
33. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 229.
34. Dallin, op. cit., p. 471.
35. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 229.
36. Dallin, op. cit., p. 470.
37. Pravda, October 30, 1957, p. 5.
38. Pravda, November 20, 1957, p. 1.
39. Izvestia, December 14, 1957, p. 4.
40. Pravda, December 22, 1957, p. 8.
41. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 585.
42. Partner, op. cit., p. 83.
43. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 465-468.
44. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 259.
45. John S. Badeau, "The Soviet Approach to the Arab World," Orbis, III (Spring 1959) p. 78.
46. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 586.
47. Partner, op. cit., p. 82.
48. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 260-261.
49. Dallin, op. cit., p. 472.

Chapter VII

1. Latif Ahmed Sherwani, "Sino-Soviet Aid Programs in Asia," Unity and Contradiction, Kurt London (ed.), p. 314.
2. Pravda, June 11, 1958.
3. Joseph S. Berliner, "Soviet Economic Policy in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, X(August 1959) p. 287.
4. A. Kodachenko, "An Important Form of Economic Co-operation," International Affairs, No. 2 (February 1962) p. 40.
5. Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid, p. 131.
6. Kodachenko, op. cit., p. 36.
7. J.S. Raleigh, "Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years," Middle Eastern Affairs, X (January, 1959) p. 16.
8. John S. Badeau, "The Soviet Approach To The Arab World," Orbis, III (Spring 1959) p. 81.
9. Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive, p. 203.
10. Sherwani, op. cit., pp. 322-323.
11. Ibid., pp. 318-319.
12. A. Sovetov, "Coexistence and Progress," International Affairs, No. 1 (January 1962) p. 13.
13. G. Mirsky, "Whither the Newly Independent Countries," International Affairs, No. 12 (December 1962) p. 26.
14. Ibid., p. 27.
15. Halford L. Hoskins, "Soviet Economic Penetration in the Middle East," Orbis, III (Winter 1960) p. 461.
16. Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 264.
17. Raleigh, op. cit., p. 17.
18. Ibid., p. 16.
19. Jan Wszelaki, Communist Economic Strategy, pp. 98-99.
20. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid, pp. 94-95.



21. Ibid., p. 171.
22. Hoskins, op. cit., p. 467.
23. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid, p. 28.
24. Badeau, op. cit., pp. 83-84.
25. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid, p. 184.

## Bibliography

All references made to publications of the Soviet press have been taken from the translations contained in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press.

1. Baczkowski, Wlodzimierz. Soviet Policy in the Middle East. Washington, D.C. Institute of Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University, 1958.
2. Badeau, John S. "The Soviet Approach to the Arab World," Orbis, III (Spring 1959) 75-84.
3. Barghoorn, Frederick C. The Soviet Cultural Offensive. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960.
4. Berliner, Joseph S. Soviet Economic Aid. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Incorporated, 1958.
5. Berliner, Joseph S. "Soviet Economic Policy in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, X (August 1959), 286-291.
6. Dallin, David J. Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin. Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1961.
7. Hoskins, Halford L. "Soviet Economic Penetration in the Middle East," Orbis, III (Winter 1960) 458-468.
8. Hoskins, Halford L. The Middle East. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954.
9. International Affairs, Moscow, No. 5, May 1956.
10. Issawi, Charles. Egypt in Revolution. London, Oxford University Press, 1963.
11. Kautsky, John H. Moscow and the Communist Party of India. The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956.
12. Khalil, Muhammad. The Arab States and the Arab League. London, Constable and Company Limited, 1962.
13. Kirk, George E. A Short History of the Middle East. London, Methuen and Company Limited, 1961.
14. Kodachenko, A. "An Important Form of Economic Co-operation," International Affairs, No. 2 (February 1962) Moscow.

15. Laqueur, Walter Z. The Soviet Union and the Middle East. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
16. Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. Third Edition. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1962.
17. Mackintosh, John M. Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy. London, Oxford University Press, 1962.
18. Manchester Guardian. publisher of The Record on Suez. 1956.
19. Mirsky, G. "Whither the Newly Independent Countries," International Affairs, No. 12, (December 1962) Moscow.
20. Partner, Peter. A Short Political Guide to the Arab World. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960.
21. Raleigh, J.S. "Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years," Middle Eastern Affairs. X (January, 1959) 3-23.
22. Seton-Watson, Hugh. "The Communist Powers and the Afro-Asian Nationalism," Unity and Contradiction. Kurt London, (ed.), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
23. Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. "Sino-Soviet Aid Programs in Asia," Unity and Contradiction, Kurt London (ed.), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
24. Sovetov, A. "Co-existence and Progress," International Affairs, No. 1, (January 1962), Moscow.
25. Wszelaki, Jan. Communist Economic Strategy. Washington D.C., National Planning Association, 1959.

### Biography

The writer of this paper, Raymond William Weber, was born in Allentown, Pennsylvania on September 7, 1941. Born to Raymond and Mary Weber, the author attended elementary and secondary schools in Allentown and received the Bachelor of Arts Degree from King's College in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania on June 2, 1963.